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I. Introduction 
Melinda Crandall was stopped at a freeway metering light 
when she was rear-ended by a teenage driver.1 At forty-five, Mrs. 
                                                                                                     
 1. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion Re: Expert Witness Testimony of Wilson C. 
HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE? 1065 
Crandall was a recovering quadriplegic with two cervical fusions 
from prior injuries.2 Mrs. Crandall was in immediate distress, 
and paramedics rushed her to a hospital.3 Beginning the day of 
the accident, Mrs. Crandall complained of new pain in her head 
and neck that made her nauseous and caused severe and 
frequent vomiting.4 Approximately ten months after the accident, 
a tear in Mrs. Crandall’s carotid artery led to a stroke, which 
caused permanent cognitive deficits.5  
Mrs. Crandall’s automobile insurer hired a neurologist, Dr. 
Alan Goldman, to decide whether the tear in the artery could 
have been caused by the collision.6 Dr. Goldman reported that the 
accident had worsened Mrs. Crandall’s head and neck pain, 
which had caused vomiting, which in turn probably caused the 
artery to tear.7 Dr. Goldman attributed 60% of Mrs. Crandall’s 
headaches to the rear-end accident and 40% to preexisting 
injuries.8 Based on that report and similar opinions from Mrs. 
Crandall’s treating doctors, the Crandalls submitted a claim for 
medical expenses under their auto insurance policy.9 The insurer 
denied their claim.10 
Melinda filed a lawsuit. In response, her insurance company 
hired experts, including a biomechanical engineer, Wilson C. 
Hayes, Ph.D.11 Dr. Hayes used accident reconstruction 
                                                                                                     
Hayes, Ph.D. and Incorporated Memorandum in Support at 2, Crandall v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins., No. 2:11-CV-00497 (D. Utah Mar. 4, 2013), 2013 WL 9850959 
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion]. The speed of the teenager’s vehicle was 
later estimated to be five miles per hour or less. Id. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Crandall v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:11-CV-497-RJS, 2013 WL 
5819283, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 2013). 
 6. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Crandall, 2013 WL 5819283, at *1. The Crandall’s American Family 
auto insurance policy promised $100,000 for medical expenses, with an 
additional $1,000,000 available in an umbrella policy. At the time the Crandalls 
submitted the claim, a life care planner had estimated that Mrs. Crandall’s 
medical expenses would exceed $2,000,000. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at xv–xix. 
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techniques and computer software to simulate forces in the 
accident.12 Dr. Hayes concluded that the collision was incapable 
of causing either the arterial injury or any aggravation of prior 
injuries because the forces were comparable to “activities of daily 
living,” such as skipping rope, running and abruptly stopping, 
and hopping.13 Melinda moved to exclude Dr. Hayes’s opinions 
under Daubert.14 The federal district court judge allowed some of 
Dr. Hayes’s opinions, but excluded any opinions regarding 
whether or not the accident was the cause of Mrs. Crandall’s 
injuries. Referring to the sparse case law applying Daubert to 
biomechanical engineers’ testimony, the judge observed that 
“there are cases all over the map on this issue.”15 
Biomechanical engineers’ entry into personal injury litigation 
has sparked debate about scientists’ role in personal injury 
litigation.16 Medical experts have a longstanding monopoly on 
injury causation testimony, but some now argue that 
biomechanical engineers are even more qualified to determine the 
cause of traumatic injuries.17 Biomechanical experts use 
                                                                                                     
 12. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion Re: Expert 
Witness Testimony of Wilson C. Hayes, Ph.D. and Incorporated Memorandum 
in Support, Exhibit C at 2, 19, Crandall v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., No. 2:11-CV-
00497 (D. Utah Mar. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion]. Dr. Hayes’s testimony regarding the force necessary 
to cause arterial injury contradicted the testimony of a neurologist, 
neurosurgeon, and a neuro-interventional surgeon. See Plaintiffs’ Daubert 
Motion, supra note 1, at xv–xix (quoting five medical experts as testifying that 
minor, trivial trauma can cause carotid artery dissection). 
 13. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 
12, Exhibit C at 2, 19. There are many cases like Crandall v. American Family 
Mutual Insurance. Auto insurers have been hiring biomechanical experts with 
increasing frequency after denying a claim. See, e.g., Mason v. Rizzi, 89 A.3d 32, 
34 (Del. 2004) (setting out nearly identical facts and proffered expert testimony); 
Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1226–27 (Del. 2004) (same); see also See Donna 
L. Burden et al., Biomechanical Engineering Testimony: Legitimate Expert 
Analysis or Junk Science?, 47 DRI DEF. 21, 21 (2005) (“Today, biomechanical 
engineers are being used in a variety of cases to address the forces involved in 
an accident (especially low-impact cases) and to determine whether the accident 
could have caused a plaintiff’s injuries.”). 
 14. Transcript of Record at 10, Crandall v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., No. 2:11-
CV-00497 (D. Utah May 30, 2014), ECF No. 129. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. (collecting arguments made in courts regarding the 
qualifications of biomechanical engineers). 
 17. See Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra 
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computer simulations and physics in a “high technology approach 
to causation” that may appear more credible than “the more 
traditional but low-technology clinical approach.”18 Trial courts 
applying Daubert to biomechanical experts’ qualifications and 
methodologies have reached contradictory results, often providing 
little explanation for their decisions.19 
This Note applies the Daubert standard to typical 
biomechanical engineer qualifications and methodologies. This 
Note argues that biomechanical expert testimony regarding 
injury causation should be limited due to engineers’ inability to 
adapt generic data to individual plaintiffs. Part II gives a brief 
explanation of biomechanical engineering. Part III provides an 
overview of the law governing the admission of expert testimony. 
Part IV applies Daubert’s qualifications prong and argues that 
biomechanical engineers who lack medical expertise should only 
be allowed to make general statements about injury causation. 
Part V applies Daubert’s reliability prong to typical forensic 
biomechanical methodologies and argues that extrapolation from 
population-based studies is not a reliable basis for specific 
causation opinions. Part V also argues that some opinions 
regarding general aspects of injury causation may be 
inadmissible due to the limitations of biomechanical research. 
Part VI applies Daubert’s relevance and helpfulness prong and 
argues that general causation opinions are not always relevant, 
                                                                                                     
note 12, Exhibit 1 at 9 (quoting a prominent biomechanical expert’s affidavit 
that “[i]n most instances it is the biomechanical expert rather than the medical 
practitioner who is most qualified, on the basis of education, training and 
experience, to express opinions on issues of injury causation”); Layssard v. 
United States, No. 06-0352, 2007 WL 4144936, at *7–8 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007) 
(“In essence, [the biomechanical engineer] . . . refuses to defer to the opinion of a 
medical doctor because the medical doctor presumably does not have his own 
engineering knowledge.”); David L. Gushue et al., Low Speed Impacts: Effective 
Use of Biomedical Engineers, 53 DRI DEF. 18, 18 (arguing that medical doctors 
“lack information, expertise, and a sufficient technical basis to evaluate the 
nature of the collision environment which is necessary to provide an opinion 
regarding injury causation”). 
 18. Michael D. Freeman & Sean S. Kohles, An Evaluation of Applied 
Biomechanics as an Adjunct to Systematic Specific Causation in Forensic 
Medicine, 161 WIEN MED WOCHENSCHR 458, 458 (2011) [hereinafter Freeman & 
Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics]. 
 19. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (describing contradictory 
outcomes). 
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especially when the plaintiff’s body is unlike those of test subjects 
in the biomechanical literature. Part VII offers a summary and 
proposes a roadmap for applying the Daubert standard to 
biomechanical expert opinions in personal injury cases. 
II. Background 
Biomechanics exists at the crossroads of engineering and 
biology,20 focusing on how mechanical energy affects human 
tissue.21 Biomechanical engineering is a branch of biomedical 
engineering, which falls within the broader field of 
bioengineering.22 Biomechanical research has contributed to 
our understanding of motor vehicle and aircraft 
crashworthiness,23 childbirth,24 slip-and-fall accidents,25 child 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Robert M. Arthur, “Bioengineering,” a Definition, 14 BIOSCIENCE 29, 
29 (1964) (“Bioengineering is presently being practiced by engineers who have 
taken an interest in biology . . . .”).  
 21. See, e.g., Garner v. Baird, 910 N.Y.S.2d 762, 762 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2010) 
(defining biomechanics as “the application of physics and mechanical engineering 
to the human body”); Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, 
supra note 18, at 458 (“Biomechanics may be simply defined as the study of the 
effect of mechanical energy on biological tissue.”); Y.C. Fung, Biomechanics, Its 
Scope, History and Some Problems of Continuum Mechanics in Physiology, 21 
APPLIED MECHANICS REV. 1, 28 (1968) (“[B]iomechanics is mechanics applied to 
biology.”). 
 22. See Fung, supra note 21, at 29 fig.1 (listing biomechanics and 
bioastronautics as part of the broader field of biomedics). 
 23. See id. at 399 (discussing the relationship between biomechanical 
engineers and the National Highway Safety Bureau, which developed a set of 
standards controlling the performance of cars in terms of their crashworthiness); 
see also NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT: BUS 
CRASHWORTHINESS 15 (Sept. 21, 1999) (discussing the benefit of computer 
simulations created by biomechanical engineers of a school bus roll-over as a tool 
“to evaluate specific mechanical and biomechanical issues for similar types of 
accidents”); Jeffrey Augenstein & Kennerly Digges, Performance of Advanced Air 
Bags Based on Data William Lehman Injury Research Center and New NASS 
PSUs, 47TH ANN. PROC. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT AUTOMOTIVE MED. 1, 1–2 (2003) 
(discussing methods used for gathering data from patients suffering traumatic 
injuries and making connections to vehicle safety design). 
 24. See James A. Ashton-Miller & John O.L. DeLancey, On the Biomechanics 
of Vaginal Birth and Common Sequelae, 11 ANN. REV. BIOMECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING 163, 173 (2009) (discussing the biomechanics of childbirth and 
developing a biomechanical model for anterior vaginal wall prolapse). 
 25. See Wojciech Wach & Jan Unarski, Fall From Height in a Stairwell—
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abuse,26 athletics,27 and even the motor development of infants 
and children.28 While a general interest in the connection 
between biology and physics is nothing new, the field of 
biomechanics has only received widespread recognition in recent 
decades.29 
A. Biomechanics in Litigation 
Outside of litigation, biomechanical research focuses in 
several main areas, including: (i) how and why injuries occur in 
populations; (ii) which of two or more competing injury 
mechanisms was most likely to have caused an injury; and 
(iii) how an injury might have been mitigated by safety 
countermeasures.30 Biomechanical analyses have been helpful as 
an adjunct to medical investigations seeking to discover how an 
                                                                                                     
Mechanics and Simulation Analysis, 244 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 136, 136 (2014) 
(describing the body of biomechanical research regarding falls from height as 
“extensive”). 
 26. See Mary Clyde Pierce & Gina Bertocci, Injury Biomechanics and Child 
Abuse, 10 ANN. REV. BIOMECHANICAL ENGINEERING 85, 88 (2008) (discussing the 
role of biomechanical research in improving the accuracy of “differentiating child 
abuse from accidental trauma”). 
 27. See Caroline F. Finch, Shahid Ullah & Andrew S. McIntosh, Combining 
Epidemiology and Biomechanics in Sports Injury Prevention Research, 41 SPORTS 
MED. 59, 65 (2011) (“Aetiological approaches towards studying sports injury, 
which aim to understand how and why injuries occur, need to be firmly planted 
in biomechanics.”). 
 28. See A. J. ‘‘Knoek’’ van Soest & Annick Ledebt, Towards a Broader 
Scope of Biomechanics in Developmental Studies: A Commentary on Jensen 
(2005), 14 INFANT CHILD DEV. 513, 515–16 (2005) (applying biomechanical 
principles to explain universal sequence in motor milestones). 
 29. See Murray Mackay, The Increasing Importance of the Biomechanics of 
Impact Trauma, 32 SĀDHANĀ 397, 401–02 (2007) (discussing the rise of 
experimental impact biomechanics in the 1980s and 1990s). 
 30. See Michael D. Freeman & Sean S. Kohles, Applications and 
Limitations of Forensic Biomechanics: A Bayesian Perspective, 17 J. FORENSIC 
LEGAL MED. 67, 67 (2009) [hereinafter Freeman & Kohles, Forensic 
Biomechanics] (discussing differences between biomechanical research in the 
field and litigation-related analyses); see also R. Bahr & T. Krosshaug, 
Understanding Injury Mechanisms: A Key Component of Preventing Injuries in 
Sport, 9 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 324, 325 (2005) (stating that proper 
documentation of activities surrounding injury is a critical step in preventing 
future injuries and identifying potential mechanisms of injury). 
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injury occurred.31 In addition, competent analyses of how injuries 
may be prevented have been routinely admitted in product 
liability litigation.32 In personal litigation, however, 
biomechanical experts often focus less on how injuries may have 
occurred and more on whether injury occurred.33 
Biomechanical engineers’ first serious foray into litigation 
consulting came in 1979.34 In the decade that followed, 
biomechanical engineers were predominantly hired in product 
liability litigation to offer opinions about design defects and 
alternative designs.35 There were no notable court opinions 
applying Daubert to a biomechanic’s injury causation opinion 
until 1997, when the Sixth Circuit decided Smelser v. Norfolk 
Southern Railway.36 In Smelser, the Sixth Circuit held that a 
trial court should have limited biomechanical expert opinions to 
those regarding general aspects of causation.37 The Smelser 
                                                                                                     
 31. See June A. Ejlersen et al., An Unusual Case of Sudden Unexpected 
Death: Postmortem Investigation and Biomechanical Analysis of the Cervical 
Spine, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 462, 464 (2007) (describing a biomechanical analysis 
as an adjunct to a medical investigation of traumatology and cause of death). 
 32. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (collecting cases). 
 33. See Freeman & Kohles, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 67 
(noting that the goals of forensic biomechanical analyses are different than the 
goals of biomechanical analyses outside of litigation); see also Wilson C. Hayes 
et al., Forensic Injury Biomechanics, 2 ANN. REV. BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 55, 
58 (2007) (arguing that biomechanical engineers can adapt and revise 
population-based criteria to apply to individuals). 
 34. See Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490, 498 (Md. App. 
1979) (admitting expert biomechanical engineer testimony regarding design 
safety in a defective manufacturing case involving a van rollover); see also 
Crump v. Universal Safety Equip. Co., 398 N.E.2d 188, 193 (Ill. App. 1979) 
(referencing biomechanical expert testimony regarding safety glasses in a 
product liability case). 
 35. See cases cited supra note 34 (collecting cases); see also Mannino v. Int’l 
Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding biomechanical expert 
testimony admissible regarding an allegedly defective child’s car seat safety 
strap); Pineda v. L.A. Turf Club, Inc., 169 Cal. Rptr. 66, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(noting a biomechanical consultant’s trial testimony regarding an allegedly 
defective helmet); Cloud v. State, 420 So. 2d 1259, 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1982) 
(noting a biomechanical expert’s opinion regarding the safety of stairs based on 
slope and tread but criticizing the expert’s opinion regarding the cause of the 
plaintiff’s fall); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Wis. 
1984) (noting biomechanical expert testimony in a products liability case 
regarding the design of a passenger seat). 
 36. 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 37. See id. at 305 (limiting biomechanical expert testimony to opinions 
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opinion is discussed in more detail in Part IV.B. Despite Smelser, 
the practice of retaining biomechanical experts in personal injury 
cases has become increasingly popular in the past twenty years.38 
III. Rules Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
This Part reviews the evolution of legal standards for expert 
testimony, beginning with the previously predominant test 
derived from Frye v. United States.39 It then discusses the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of those rules in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals40 as creating a new standard for expert 
testimony. Finally, it details the three prongs of the Daubert 
standard: expert qualifications, reliable methodology, and 
relevance. 
A. The Frye “General Acceptance” Test 
Between 1923 and 1993, the standard for evaluating expert 
testimony was rooted in Frye, a D.C. Circuit opinion. Under the 
Frye standard, the exclusive test for admissibility was whether 
an expert’s methodology was “sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.”41 Some commentators criticized Frye as inflexible 
because it excluded novel scientific evidence that might have 
been reliable.42 
                                                                                                     
regarding general aspects of injury causation). 
 38. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 458 (noting that the use of forensic biomechanical methods to explain 
injury causation has been increasing over the past twenty years). 
 39. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 40. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 41. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 42. See, e.g., Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 
FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 628 (1988) (arguing that the Frye test was too incoherent 
to be applied effectively by the courts); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of 
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207–08, 1223 (1980) (arguing that the Frye test was too 
vague and led to inconsistent results); DAVID H. DAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE, 
A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 5.3.3 (2004) (noting that the Frye 
1072 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2016) 
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective, 
including Rule 702, which provided that “if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.”43 The adoption of Rule 702 “did not specifically 
preclude the use of the Frye standard to evaluate expert 
testimony,”44 so “the effect of Rule 702 on the Frye standard was 
unclear.”45 
B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Current 
Standard  
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert and clarified 
that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced the 
Frye test.46 The Court explained that under the new standard, 
judges have a gatekeeping duty to assess whether expert 
qualifications and methodologies meet Rule 702’s twin standards 
of relevance and reliability.47 The Court suggested factors that 
would assist the judiciary in assessing the scientific validity of 
proffered expert evidence, including testability, peer review, rates 
of error, and general acceptance.48 Subsequent cases and the 
                                                                                                     
opinion was unclear in its standard). 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 44. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 
339, 340 (2002). 
 45. Andrew Jurs & Scott De Vito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical 
Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 675, 685 
(2013). 
 46. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) 
(discussing the Frye test and stating, “That austere standard, absent from, and 
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in 
federal trials”). 
 47. See id. at 592 (“Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, 
the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether 
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist 
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.”). 
 48. See infra notes 59–64 (outlining factors that have been suggested as 
helpful in assessing scientific testimony). 
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Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702 have elaborated on and 
added to these factors.49 
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has explained that “the 
Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a 
somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have 
been admissible under Frye.”50 In Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael,51 the Court stated that the intent of the Daubert 
standard was to ensure that any expert “employ[] in the 
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes 
the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”52 While a majority 
of states have adopted standards that are similar or identical to 
the federal Daubert standard, more than a dozen states and the 
District of Columbia continue to apply the Frye test, and a 
handful of states have developed different evidentiary 
standards.53 This Note applies only the Daubert standard. 
1. Expert Qualifications 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that an expert be 
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education.”54 This standard has been characterized as a “liberal 
one” but still requires “that the area of the witness’s competence 
match the subject matter of the witness’s testimony.”55 
                                                                                                     
 49. See infra notes 59–64 (same). 
 50. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). 
 51. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 52. Id. at 152. 
 53. See generally Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for 
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 
A.L.R.5th 453 (2014) (comparing states’ evidentiary standards for expert 
testimony). 
 54. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 55. Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (M.D. Ga. 2007) 
(citations omitted). 
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2. Reliable Methods 
Rule 702 requires that experts testify based on “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge.”56 The Court in 
Daubert interpreted this to mean that the methods underlying an 
expert’s opinions must be reliable.57 To be reliable, the expert’s 
reasoning or methodology must be “scientifically valid” and 
capable of being “properly applied to the facts in issue.”58 The 
assessment of reliability is a flexible one, with many potentially 
relevant considerations.59 The Court in Daubert and its progeny 
identified some non-exclusive factors, including whether a theory 
or technique “can be (and has been) tested;”60 “whether the theory 
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;”61 
“[w]hether . . . there is a high ‘known or potential rate of error’ 
and whether there are ‘standards controlling the technique’s 
operation.’”62 “General acceptance” can also have a bearing on the 
inquiry.63 The Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 702 add five 
additional considerations: 
(1) Whether the expert is proposing to testify about matters 
growing naturally and directly out of research he has 
conducted independent of the litigation, or whether he has 
developed his opinion expressly for purposes of testifying; 
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an 
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion; (3) Whether the 
expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative 
explanations; (4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he 
would be in his regular professional work outside his paid 
litigation consulting; (5) Whether the field of expertise claimed 
                                                                                                     
 56. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 57. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“In 
short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific 
knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”). 
 58. Id. at 592–93. 
 59. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not 
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (quoting 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94). 
 63. See id. (explaining the Daubert factors). 
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by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of 
opinion the expert would give.64 
Forensic biomechanical analyses may not always fit nicely 
within the Daubert framework because “the case-specific nature 
of the inquiry makes it rarely publication worthy, subject to error 
rate calculations, or even testable in practice.”65 However, courts 
should still consider whether a biomechanical engineer’s 
methodology is testable, whether its use raises error rate 
concerns (such as construct validity, external validity, internal 
validity),66 and whether “there is simply too great an analytical 
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”67 Where expert 
testimony depends on a chain of inferences or interlinked 
methodologies, “[a]ny step that renders the analysis 
unreliable . . . renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible. This 
is true whether the step completely changes a reliable 
methodology or merely misapplies that methodology.”68 
3. Relevance 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that expert testimony 
“help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue.”69 Expert testimony must be “sufficiently tied to 
the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual 
dispute.”70 In a personal injury case, the causation dispute is “the 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee’s note (2000 
amends.)). 
 65. Cf. 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 44:9 (2013–2014) (discussing the 
application of Daubert to accident reconstruction techniques); see also John B. 
Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert Factor: How Judges 
Use Error Rates in Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1063, 1080 
(2014) (“[A]pplicable error rates are not available in many disciplines.”). 
 66. See id. at 1067 (stating that where numerical error rates are 
unavailable, “the judge must examine the methodology for flaws that are likely 
to produce errors”). 
 67. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
 68. Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 346 F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 
2003) (quoting Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc. 165 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 69. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 70. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985); see 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for 
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degree to which [a] particular plaintiff[] [was] injured in this 
particular automobile accident.”71 Finally, otherwise relevant 
opinions may still be excluded if they are “substantially 
outweighed” by unfair prejudice or a risk of misleading the jury 
or confusing the issues.72 
IV. Biomechanical Expert Qualifications 
This Part applies the first prong of the Daubert standard to 
typical biomechanical expert qualifications. First, it discusses 
education, training, and experience common among 
biomechanical engineers. Next, it notes similarities between the 
field of biomechanics and the field of toxicology and discusses an 
emerging distinction between general and specific causation in 
personal injury litigation. It then discusses two notable cases, 
Smelser73 and Eskin v. Carden,74 to illustrate different 
approaches courts have taken to assess the scope of 
biomechanical expert qualifications. Finally, it argues that the 
Smelser approach―requiring medical expertise for specific injury 
causation opinions―is the most appropriate rule.  
A. Typical Education, Experience, Skill, and Training 
Witnesses claiming biomechanical expertise have diverse 
backgrounds. Many have an advanced degree in physiology, 
mathematics, physics, or mechanical engineering.75 Less common 
                                                                                                     
one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”); 
see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (“Expert 
testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, 
ergo, non-helpful.” (quoting 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S 
EVIDENCE, § 702[02] (1991))). 
 71. Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 768 (Wash. App. 2012). 
 72. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 73. 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 74. 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004). 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 1375 (noting degrees in physiology, mathematics, and 
chemistry); Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *4–5 
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008) (“Dr. Fijan is a mechanical engineer specializing in 
biomechanics. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in mechanical engineering from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.S.E. in engineering science from 
HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE? 1077 
are degrees in areas such as physical education.76 Some who 
claim to be qualified as biomechanical engineers took anatomy or 
physiology classes with first-year medical students.77  
Some who claim biomechanical expertise teach courses such 
as engineering, physiology, anatomy, or exercise science.78 Others 
are employed as consultants with experience in workplace 
ergonomics, occupational injury prevention, or vehicle and 
aircraft crashworthiness.79 Some have conducted crash tests, 
vehicle sled tests, occupant kinematics analyses, or are involved 
in research on injury mechanics and human injury tolerance.80  
While some schools, including Stanford University, offer a 
biomechanical engineering program, most schools do not.81 
                                                                                                     
the University of Florida.”); Wilcox v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2007 
WL 1576708, at *27 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 2007) (“These accomplishments are 
many as far as the study of physiology, health, and ‘exercise science’ are 
concerned.”). 
 76. See Wilcox, 2007 WL 1576708, at *22 (discussing the qualifications of 
David Nieman, Ph.D.). 
 77. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Boler, 890 N.E.2d 1174, 1182 (2008) (discussing the 
education of Michele Grimm, Ph.D.). In addition to attending courses at medical 
schools, some biomechanical engineers teach classes at medical schools in areas 
typically limited to anatomy or physiology. See Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 
F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1375 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (noting that John Trimble, Ph.D., a 
biomechanical engineer, taught courses in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology 
at a medical school). 
 78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the education and 
experience of biomechanical engineers). 
 79. See, e.g., Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008) (noting the practical experience of Robert S. Fijan, 
Ph.D.); Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10C–12–054, 2014 WL 
5038142, at *34 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2014) (noting that William Muzzy, a 
biomechanical engineer had “24 years of crash injury testing experience with 
human volunteers and 22 years of experience analyzing the effectiveness of 
occupant restraints in automotive and aircraft crashes,” in addition to 
publishing articles on human tolerance to crash forces (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 80. See cases cited supra note 62 (discussing the practical experience of 
witnesses found to have expertise in the field of biomechanics). 
 81. See Biomechanical Engineering Major Program, STAN. U., 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/ughb/cgi-bin/handbook/index.php/Biomechanical_
Engineering_Major_Program (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (detailing the 
requirements for an undergraduate degree in biomechanical engineering) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Laugelle, 2014 WL 
5038142, at *10 n.85 (noting a biomechanical engineer’s testimony that a 
biomechanical engineering degree “did not exist when he began his research in 
1967”). 
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Apparently, there is no single route to obtaining biomechanical 
expertise. However, an understanding of physics, mathematics, 
and engineering are helpful in order to make the calculations 
necessary for accident reconstruction.82 Qualifications in 
biomedical engineering are typically necessary to perform 
computer simulations.83 Qualifications in statistics are desirable 
in order to understand and apply biomechanical literature.84 In 
addition, a medical degree is required to diagnose injury.85 For 
these reasons, “[q]ualified experts in the field of . . . biomechanics 
are a rare breed. This discipline requires expertise in both 
mechanical engineering and in medical sciences.”86 
B. Smelser: An Emerging Distinction Between General and 
Specific Causation 
Many courts that have considered the scope of biomechanical 
engineers’ qualifications have cited favorably to the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Smelser.87 In Smelser, the United States 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Boykin v. W. Exp., Inc., No. 12-CV-7428, 2015 WL 539423, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) (finding an expert not qualified in engineering but 
admitting accident reconstruction testimony due to extensive experience 
reconstructing the type of accident in question). 
 83. See K.S. Krishnan et al., An Injury Threshold Model For Two-Car 
Collisions, 29 MGMT. SCI. 909, 910 (1983) (“The study of occupant motion . . . is 
generally in the realm of biomedical science.”). 
 84. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 6:3 (2007) (“Individuals who specialize in 
using statistical methods—and whose professional careers demonstrate this 
orientation—are more likely to apply appropriate procedures and correctly 
interpret the results.”). 
 85. See Combs v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 507 S.E.2d 355, 358 (Va. 1998) 
(“[T]he question of causation of a human injury is a component part of a 
diagnosis, which in turn is part of the practice of medicine.”). 
 86. Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1229 n.12 (Del. 2004) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87. See Kelham v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-316, 2015 WL 4426027, 
at *6 (N.D. Ind. July 17, 2015) (“Although not binding, this court will follow 
Smelser and the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.”); Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. 
Supp. 2d 1208, 1212 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (adopting the reasoning in Smelser and 
noting that “[o]ther courts that have considered whether a biomechanical 
engineer is qualified to testify about the cause of an injury have ruled 
consistently with Smelser”); Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 
2115250, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2008) (adopting the reasoning in Smelser); 
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it was an abuse of 
discretion to allow a biomechanic’s testimony regarding an 
injury’s precise cause because the engineer was not qualified to 
consider two things that could affect injuries resulting from an 
accident: First, “the different tolerance levels . . . of individuals,” 
and second, the “pre-existing medical conditions of individuals.”88 
The court found the engineer’s expertise in biomechanics 
qualified him only to “describe[] the forces generated in 
the . . . collision, and [speak] in general about the types of injuries 
those forces would generate.”89 
Smelser implies that legal causation can be separated into 
two distinct sub-elements: general and specific injury causation.90 
This distinction is a settled principle in toxic tort litigation, but 
before Smelser was not used in traditional personal injury 
litigation.91 General causation is concerned with whether a 
substance can cause harm.92 In toxic tort cases, general causation 
refers to “epidemiological evidence indicating a consistent 
statistically significant relationship between exposure and 
                                                                                                     
Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (same); 
Shires v. King, No. 2:05-CV-84, 2006 WL 5171770, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 
2006) (same). 
 88. Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997).  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See 1 KAREN GOTTLIEB, TOXIC TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE § 15:3 (2014) 
(explaining that proof of causation in toxic tort litigation requires proof of both 
general and specific causation). See also generally Kerriann Laubach, Note, 
Epigenetics and Toxic Torts: How Epidemiological Evidence Informs Causation, 
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2016) (discussing the element of causation in toxic 
tort cases). 
 92. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 23:1 (2007) (explaining the difference 
between specific and general causation). The concept of general causation has 
its roots in work by Sir Austin Bradford Hill, an acclaimed English scientist of 
the 1900s who was a “pioneer in medical statistics and epidemiology.” Michael 
Höfler, The Bradford Hill Considerations on Causality: A Counterfactual 
Perspective, 2 EMERGING THEMES EPIDEMIOLOGY 11, 11 (2005). Hill became 
famous for developing a list of considerations for determining “whether an 
observed association involved a causal component or not,” including consistency, 
specificity, temporality, biological plausibility, experiment, analogy, and others. 
Id.; see also Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or 
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC. MED. 295, 295–300 (1965) (listing eight 
relevant factors when considering whether an observed association is a causal 
relationship). 
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injury.”93 The analog in personal injury litigation would be 
population-based evidence showing a relationship between a type 
of traumatic force and a type of injury.94  
Specific causation, on the other hand, is concerned with 
whether a substance caused the plaintiff’s injury.95 The 
equivalent in personal injury cases is whether a traumatic 
incident caused the plaintiff’s injury.96 Translating this 
distinction into personal injury terms, biomechanical experts 
enter the realm of specific causation when they opine that a 
trauma did or did not cause the plaintiff’s injuries.97 
C. Toxicology and Biomechanics: An Analogy 
The adoption of a toxic tort causation principle may seem 
odd, but comparing the fields of toxicology and biomechanics 
reveals striking similarities. Toxicologists and biomechanical 
engineers both seek to answer the same basic questions: 
(1) “What hazards does [an exposure] present to human 
populations . . . ?” and (2) “What degree of risk is associated 
with . . . [an] exposure at any given dose?”98  
Researchers in the two fields share many dilemmas. For 
example, “it is often unethical to experiment on humans,” and 
humans are only rarely exposed “in a manner that permits a 
quantitative determination” of cause and effect.99 In addition, the 
data available in either field is limited in the number of “case 
reports, or even experimental studies [performed] . . . under 
                                                                                                     
 93. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 23:3. 
 94. See Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1355 (M.D. Ga. 
2007) (discussing whether vibration is causally linked to injury). 
 95. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, supra note 92, § 23:1 (explaining the difference 
between specific and general causation). 
 96. See Burke v. TranSam Trucking, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 327, 334 (M.D. 
Pa. 2009) (noting that specific causation opinions include the extent of the 
injuries suffered by the plaintiff). 
 97. See infra notes 134–139 (collecting cases that help define the boundary 
between general and specific causation opinions). 
 98. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 637 (listing difficulties in the science of toxicology). In toxicology, 
exposures are substances, while in biomechanics exposures are types of forces. 
The term “dose” in toxicology translates to a degree of force in biomechanics. 
 99. Id. at 636. 
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circumstances that permit analysis of dose-response 
relationships, [or] mechanisms of action.”100 Research in both 
fields is also hindered by the fact that “human sensitivity . . . can 
vary greatly among individuals.”101  
The application of information from either field requires 
“extrapolation, either across species . . . or across doses.” Finally, 
both fields rely on medical examinations and diagnoses to confirm 
that subjects are ill or injured.102 These similarities may explain 
why Smelser adopted the distinction between general and specific 
causation.103 
D. The Smelser Rule: Medical Expertise Is Necessary to Offer 
Specific Causation Opinions  
Toxicologists who give specific causation testimony in court 
must show that they are not only qualified to testify about 
population-based research but also to take and interpret a 
medical history, perform a physical examination, administer 
medical tests, and to understand the “time pattern of symptoms 
and disease manifestations” and the constellation of symptoms 
that support or rule out causation.104 The Smelser line of cases 
                                                                                                     
 100. Id. at 639. 
 101. Id. at 642; see also Laubach, supra note 91, at 1040–41 (discussing the 
use of dose-response curves in proving causation in toxic tort cases, and stating, 
“[a]lthough these curves are useful for quantifying disease risk, they can vary 
for each individual, depending on genetic, epigenetic, and environmental 
factors—and a combination of all three.”); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 639 (3d ed. 2011) (describing 
toxicological study designs); Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 58 (proposing a 
method to revise population-based biomechanical criteria to apply to 
individuals). 
 102. See id. at 670–71 (stating that specific causation opinions regarding 
toxic exposures require an “examination of the patient as well as appropriate 
medical testing,” in addition to a review of medical records). 
 103. See, e.g., Earl v. Cryovac, 772 P.2d 725, 726 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) 
(applying the general-specific causation requirements in a toxic tort case). 
 104. Compare FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 667–74 (noting 
that relevant individual characteristics in the context of toxic substances 
include physical activity, age, sex, genetic makeup, dose, route of entry, tissue 
solubility, metabolism, personal and family medical history, symptomology, and 
interaction with other chemicals), with L. Uhrenholt et al., Degenerative and 
Traumatic Changes in the Lower Cervical Spine Facet Joints, 37 SCAND. J. 
RHEUMATOLOGY 375, 380–83 (2008) (discussing the effects of age, sex, and prior 
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indicate that biomechanical experts must have similar medical 
expertise before giving specific injury causation opinions.105  
One difference between toxicology and biomechanics is that 
“many highly qualified toxicologists are physicians”106 and 
therefore are qualified to fill both scientific and medical roles, 
while biomechanical engineers with medical degrees are rare.107 
As a general rule, biomechanical engineers lack the education 
required to examine a plaintiff, take medical tests, thoroughly 
review and understand medical records, including diagnostic 
imaging, identify relevant symptoms, or rule out alternative 
causes of those symptoms.108 Therefore, courts adopting the 
Smelser distinction between specific and general causation have 
                                                                                                     
traumatic history on the lower cervical spine’s characteristics and susceptibility 
to traumatic injury), and Jacqueline R. Center et al., Risk of Subsequent 
Fracture After Low-Trauma Fracture in Men and Women, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
387, 393 (2007) (examining absolute as well as relative re-fracture risks in a 
cohort study), and David J. Daegling et al., Structural Analysis of Human Rib 
Fracture and Implications for Forensic Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1301, 
1305–06 (2008) (noting the potential for large individual differences in bone 
porosity and mineralization, leading to individual differences in bone 
brittleness), and Caroline F. Finch et al., supra note 27, at 65 (stating that 
tissue strength plays a role in injury causation and varies by age and sex, and 
can increase or decrease based on training and lifestyle). 
 105. See Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(criticizing a biomechanical engineer’s failure to examine complete medical 
records and discuss symptomology with the plaintiff); Bowers v. Norfolk S. 
Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (finding no evidence that a 
biomechanical engineer was capable of interpreting x-rays and was not familiar 
with potentially relevant medical conditions); Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 
1231 (Del. 2004) (finding a biomechanical engineer incompetent to properly 
review medical records or examine the plaintiff, and stating that no evidence 
suggested “that any expert in his field would be competent, or would have taken 
the opportunity to do so”); Harden v. Haven, No. 05-2009-CA-065372, 2014 Fla. 
Cir. LEXIS 815, at *13 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 10, 2014) (noting that a biomechanical 
expert was also “a qualified medical doctor, who can discuss specific causation 
and medical issues, in addition to general causation issues at a biomechanic 
level”). 
 106. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 675.  
 107. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (listing common 
undergraduate and graduate degrees obtained by biomechanical engineers). 
 108. See cases cited supra note 105 (pointing out areas where biomechanical 
engineers are unqualified); Harden, 2014 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 815, at *13 
(discussing the qualifications of a biomechanical engineer who was also a 
qualified medical doctor). 
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typically limited biomechanical engineers’ testimony to opinions 
that concern injury causation in general.109 
E. Clarifying the Distinction Between General and Specific 
Causation 
Drawing a line between general and specific causation is not 
always easy.110 Some courts attempting to apply Smelser reach 
apparently inconsistent outcomes.111 Some variation in 
interpretation is hardly surprising because the distinction 
between specific and general causation in the personal injury 
context is relatively new.112  
While the dividing line is not crystal clear, general causation 
opinions should probably include testimony about which of 
multiple competing mechanisms was more likely to cause an 
injury113 and whether population-based studies show a 
                                                                                                     
 109. See Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Fla. 
2009) (excluding biomechanical experts’ specific causation opinions); Wagoner v. 
Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 07-CV-244-J, 2008 WL 5120750, at *2 (D. Wyo. 
June 19, 2008) (excluding biomechanical experts’ specific causation opinions); 
Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 
2008) (limiting biomechanical expert testimony to general causation opinions); 
Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (same). 
 110. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 460 (noting that specific and general causation “are inextricably 
interwoven, inasmuch as specific causation depends on principles of general 
causation, and general causation is based upon a foundation of individual cases 
of specific causation”). 
 111. Compare Wagoner v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 07-CV-244-J, 2008 
WL 5120750, at *1 (D. Wyo. June 19, 2008) (excluding biomechanical expert 
testimony that “the impact force was sufficient to cause a traumatic brain 
injury”), and Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 769 (Wash. App. 2012) 
(excluding testimony that “the forces generated by the impact were not 
sufficient to cause the type of injuries [the plaintiff] was claiming”), with Berner 
v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (allowing 
biomechanical expert testimony that the “energy on [plaintiff’s] head upon 
striking the floor was sufficient to have caused his mild to moderate traumatic 
brain injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 112. See Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(remanding for entry of a judgment as a matter of law due to the plaintiff’s 
inability to prove causation by biomechanical expert testimony alone). 
 113. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 458 (noting that the discipline of forensic biomechanics is best suited 
to “analyzing how injuries occur and in differentiating between competing injury 
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heightened risk for injury at a given level of force.114 Specific 
causation opinions, on the other hand, often take the form of a 
conclusion that an injury was or was not caused by an event.115 
Examples of biomechanical expert opinions that courts have 
labeled “specific” include the following:  
• “It is impossible . . . to conclude that the degenerative 
disease in [plaintiff’s] cervical and lumbar spines can 
be attributed to the incident.”116  
• “The accident did not contribute in any significant 
way to disc bulges . . . or other associated pathologies 
of [plaintiff’s] . . . spine.”117  
• “[T]he ‘motion’ at issue in this case caused ‘brain 
damage’ to plaintiff.”118  
• “[T]he defective shoulder belt, not the rear-end 
collision, caused [plaintiff’s] back injuries and 
aggravated . . . neck injuries.”119  
• “The forces on her body in this accident did not result 
in a concussion injury.”120 
In comparison, biomechanical expert opinions that courts 
have found to be “general” include the following:  
• The “energy on [plaintiff’s] head upon striking the 
floor was sufficient to have caused his mild to 
moderate traumatic brain injury.”121  
                                                                                                     
mechanisms for observed injuries”). 
 114. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 24 (stating that 
population-based studies that show some increased risk may “have some 
probative value . . . in proving general causation”). 
 115. See, e.g., Wilcox v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2007 WL 
1576708, at *12 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 2007) (excluding opinions relating to the 
cause of the plaintiff’s particular condition as specific causation opinions beyond 
the expertise of the biomechanical engineer). 
 116. Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Morgan v. Girgis, No. 07 CIV. 1960, 2008 WL 2115250, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 16, 2008) (quotation marks omitted). 
 118. Wagoner v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 07-CV-244-J, 2008 WL 
5120750, at *2 (D. Wyo. June 19, 2008). 
 119. Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 302 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 120. Roach v. Hughes, No. 4:13-CV-00136-JHM, 2015 WL 3970739, at *12 
(W.D. Ky. June 30, 2015). 
 121. Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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• “[T]he forces [plaintiff] generated in her . . . spine[] 
during the subject accident were well below 
thresholds for damage . . . as reported in the 
biomechanics literature.”122  
The difference between specific and general causation 
opinions might seem semantic, but the distinction has significant 
legal consequences. For example, if a court applies the Smelser 
rule, a litigant relying solely on a biomechanical engineer to 
prove or rebut causation probably will not survive summary 
judgment or a motion for a directed verdict.123 
The adoption of the Smelser distinction has raised a question 
about whether both general and specific causation must be 
proven to make out a prima facie personal injury claim. Some 
biomechanical engineers argue that general causation evidence is 
always necessary and that medical doctors who lack expertise in 
biomechanics are unqualified to establish general causation.124  
This may be true in some cases. For example, in Bowers v. 
Norfolk Southern Corp.,125 two of the plaintiff’s medical experts 
claimed that locomotive vibration caused injury to the plaintiff’s 
spine.126 In rebuttal, the defendant’s biomechanical engineer 
collected biomechanical literature, estimated the amount of 
vibration experienced by the plaintiff,127 and opined that the force 
was not sufficient to cause the plaintiff’s injuries.128  
Applying Daubert, the district court in Bowers found the 
medical doctors’ premise that vibration could cause injury “too 
vague to have any meaning for a Daubert analysis,” especially 
because the plaintiff’s medical experts admitted that “not all 
vibration can cause harm.”129 The district court excluded the 
                                                                                                     
 122. Morgan, 2008 WL 2115250, at *9–10. 
 123. See id. (stating that the biomechanical engineer was the “only witness 
whose testimony connects [plaintiff’s] injuries to the allegedly defective shoulder 
belt” and finding that, absent the improper testimony, the defendant’s motion 
for a directive verdict should have been granted). 
 124. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing biomechanical 
engineers’ critiques of medical doctors’ causation opinions). 
 125. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (M.D. Ga. 2007). 
 126. See id. at 1353 (summarizing an orthopedist’s expert opinions). 
 127. See id. at 1375–76 (referencing the expert report of John Trimble, 
Ph.D.). 
 128. See id. (describing Dr. Trimble’s causation opinions). 
 129. Id. at 1355. 
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medical doctors’ opinions altogether, finding that the doctors 
failed to establish general causation.130 Notably, the district court 
also excluded the biomechanical engineer’s specific causation 
opinions due to his lack of medical qualifications.131 
The exclusion of the medical experts’ causation opinions in 
Bowers is rare for two reasons. Commentators have observed that 
plaintiffs can often establish a prima facie personal injury case 
without general causation evidence,132 especially when “the 
mechanism of causation is well understood, the causal 
relationship is well established, or the timing between cause and 
effect is close.”133 In addition, courts have found medical doctors 
qualified to opine regarding all aspects of injury causation as long 
as there is no conclusive evidence that contradicts the medical 
doctors’ general causation opinions.134 Therefore, plaintiffs must 
establish general injury causation only in rare cases where the 
mechanism of injury is not commonly associated with injury.135  
                                                                                                     
 130. See id. at 1355 (noting a lack of evidence regarding the “amount of 
vibration that is harmful to an individual, the length of time over which such 
harm normally occurs” and “the nature of the resulting harm”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. AND EMOT. HARM § 28, 
cmt. c(3) (2010) (“[M]ost courts have appropriately declined to impose a 
threshold requirement that a plaintiff always must prove causation with 
epidemiologic evidence.”). 
 133. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 609 n.180. 
 134. See Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(“[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established before a doctor can 
testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic 
methodology . . . is sound . . . products liability law does not preclude recovery 
until a ‘statistically significant’ number of people have been injured . . . .”); 
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1266–67 (D. Kan. 
2002) (allowing a vascular surgeon to testify to general causation over objections 
that the expert was not an epidemiologist); see also Layssard v. United States, 
No. 06-0352, 2007 WL 4144936, at *7–8 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2007) (allowing a 
medical doctor to testify regarding causation and stating, “Put simply, medical 
doctors are qualified—indeed, uniquely qualified—to offer opinions as to medical 
causation; bio-mechanical engineers are not”). 
 135. See Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1355 (M.D. Ga. 
2007) (stating that the unusually complex issue of causation stemming from 
unknown amounts of vibration required evidence of the link between levels of 
vibration and injury). 
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F. Eskin v. Carden: An Alternative to the Smelser Rule 
Not all courts adopt the Smelser distinction.136 The Supreme 
Court of Delaware, for example, has made no attempt to 
distinguish between general and specific causation in personal 
injury litigation. In Eskin v. Carden,137 the Supreme Court of 
Delaware held that trial judges may admit biomechanical 
experts’ opinions that a particular injury did (or did not) result 
from the forces of an accident “only where the trial judge 
determines that the testimony reliably creates a connection 
between the reaction of the human body generally to the forces 
generated by the accident and the specific individual allegedly 
injured.”138  
Simply put, the Eskin approach implies that biomechanical 
experts are qualified to offer any type of causation opinion as long 
as the methods used are reliable. Eskin also suggests that typical 
biomechanical methodologies will be acceptable when a plaintiff’s 
characteristics “fairly represent the average human body.”139 
Time has shown that courts adopting the Smelser rule exclude 
specific causation opinions under the qualifications prong of the 
Daubert analysis, while courts following the Eskin approach 
exclude some of the same opinions under the reliability prong due 
to a lack of testability, error rate, or “fit.”140 The application of the 
reliability prong is discussed in more detail in Part V. 
                                                                                                     
 136. See, e.g., Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1230 (Del. 2004) (making no 
reference to Smelser and drawing no distinction between general and specific 
causation). 
 137. 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004). 
 138. Id. at 1230. 
 139. Id. What may be the most common forensic biomechanical methodology 
is discussed in Part V.  
 140. See id. at 1232 (excluding biomechanical expert testimony that failed to 
establish a link between generic injury thresholds and a unique individual); 
Mason v. Rizzi, 89 A.3d 32, 38 (Del. 2004) (excluding generalized biomechanical 
expert testimony due to unhelpfulness, risk of misleading the jury, and unfair 
prejudice). 
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G. The Smelser Rule is The Best Approach to Biomechanical 
Expert Qualifications 
The Eskin approach overestimates the ability of engineers to 
adapt statistical curves in the biomechanical literature to any 
individual plaintiff.141 Another flaw in the Eskin approach is that 
the scope of allowable testimony hinges on a difficult question: 
whether the plaintiff’s body represents the “average human 
body.” Delaware courts have struggled to decide whether 
plaintiffs fall within the “norm” described in Eskin.142 In reality, 
even individuals who are young, healthy, and apparently 
“normal” can be injured by forces below 1% on statistical risk 
curves,143 and biomechanical science offers no way to identify 
which individuals will fall predictably along the statistical curve 
and which will not.144 
The Sixth Circuit’s approach in Smelser is the better rule 
because biomechanical engineers are typically unqualified to 
examine individuals or adapt generalized data to specific 
circumstances.145 The appropriateness of the adoption of the 
                                                                                                     
 141. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of 
biomechanical engineers to adapt general statistics to consider lifestyle, age, 
sex, or pre-existing medical conditions which may play a role in injury 
causation). 
 142. See Smith v. Grief, No. 308-2014, 2015 WL 128004, at *2 (Del. Jan. 8, 
2015) (refusing to upset a trial court’s decision to allow biomechanical testimony 
regarding the precise cause of an individual’s injuries despite the fact that the 
plaintiff was pregnant); Mason, 89 A.3d at 38 (excluding a biomechanical 
engineer’s causation opinions as lacking a connection to the plaintiff’s 
characteristics where the plaintiff had pre-existing spinal injuries); DiVirgilio v. 
Eskin, No. 02C-02-169, 2005 WL 2249530, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2005) 
(excluding a biomechanical engineer’s opinions regarding precise causation of 
injuries because the plaintiff was in an “unusual physical position” at the 
moment of impact); Frazier v. Leotta, 54 A.3d 1134, 1148 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010) 
(stating that the court was unsure whether a plaintiff who had apparently 
recovered from pre-existing conditions fell within the “norm” mentioned in 
Eskin and requesting further testimony on the issue). 
 143. See J.R. Funk et al., Biomechanical Risk Estimates for Mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury, 51 ANN. PROC. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT AUTOMOTIVE MED. 343, 357–58 
(2007) (reporting that a college football player suffered a concussion caused by 
only eighty-one g-force of acceleration). 
 144.  See id. (attributing wide variances in forces causing injury to football 
players to “variation in injury tolerance between individuals”).  
 145. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of 
biomechanical engineers to adapt general statistics to consider lifestyle, age, 
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distinction between general and specific causation is supported 
by the compelling similarities between biomechanics and 
toxicology.146 In addition, as discussed in Part V, even if 
biomechanical engineers were qualified to offer specific injury 
causation testimony, biomechanical methodologies are incapable 
of determining specific injury causation with the degree of 
reliability required under Daubert.147 
The adoption of the Smelser rule does not affect 
biomechanical engineers’ general causation opinions.148 
Competent biomechanical engineers usually have the education 
and experience necessary to calculate forces and testify about 
how collisions can be expected to affect the human body based on 
statistics in the biomechanical literature.149 Biomechanical 
engineers’ general causation opinions, however, must still assist 
the trier of fact, be relevant and reliable, provide an adequate 
“fit” to the facts of the case, be based on admissible data, and 
must not be unfairly prejudicial.150 
V. The Reliability of Forensic Biomechanical Methodologies 
This Part applies Daubert to typical biomechanical 
methodologies and argues that those considerations weigh 
against the admission of opinions based on extrapolation from 
generic injury thresholds. Finally, this Part argues that 
                                                                                                     
gender, sex, or pre-existing medical conditions that may play a role in injury 
causation). 
 146. See supra Part IV.C (drawing an analogy between toxicology and 
biomechanics). 
 147. See infra Part V.C (analyzing the accuracy of biomechanical methods 
when used to predict injury causation). 
 148. See, e.g., Berner v. Carnival Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009) (allowing biomechanical engineer testimony that accepted “the 
injuries as diagnosed by other doctors” and focused “on the forces involved in the 
blows sustained by [Berner] and . . . the levels at which certain injuries may 
occur”).  
 149. See, e.g., Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1378 (M.D. 
Ga. 2007) (applying the reasoning in Smelser to conclude that a biomechanical 
engineer could “testify generally as to the effect of locomotive vibration on the 
human body and the typical injuries that may result”). 
 150. Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. 
REV. 743, 746–50 (1999) (listing prerequisites for admissible expert testimony). 
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biomechanics’ forensic analyses are not a reliable basis for 
opinions ruling out general injury causation but may be a reliable 
basis for opinions supporting general causation.  
A. A Basic Overview of Forensic Biomechanics 
Engineers calculate the “factor of safety” of a bridge, 
structure, or other physical material by measuring its failure 
strength against “the expected stress that object will see in 
service.”151 This analysis parallels the basic approach of some 
leading biomechanical experts in personal injury litigation.152 
Biomechanics sometimes use a slightly modified ratio, known as 
the “factor of risk,” to estimate risk of injury.153 The basic 
equation divides an anatomical region’s tolerance by the force 
applied to that region.154 If the equation produces a number 
greater than one, the relative risk of injury is more probable than 
not.155  
The factor of risk equation requires at least two variables: 
(1) the level of force an anatomical region can tolerate without 
injury, and (2) the amount of force applied to the anatomical 
structure.156 To discover these variables, biomechanical engineers 
have developed a three-step analysis:157 (1) accident 
reconstruction; (2) simulation of kinematics; and (3) comparing 
estimated forces to injury risk curves documented in the 
biomechanical literature.158 These three methodologies should be 
considered separately. 
                                                                                                     
 151. See Joseph C. Musto, The Safety Factor: Case Studies in Engineering 
Judgment, 38 INT’L J. MECHANICAL ENGINEERING EDUC. 286, 286–88 (2010) 
(discussing the use of the safety factor in engineering education). 
 152. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 60 (comparing the factor of risk and 
factor of safety equations). 
 153. Id. at 60.  
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. (stating that a result of “1” equals a 50% likelihood for injury 
and that any likelihood greater than 50% is “probable”). 
 156. This does not capture the various methodologies used by every 
biomechanical engineer; it only illustrates a common approach.  
 157. See Wilson C. Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 68 (outlining a three-step 
approach for forensic biomechanical inquiries). 
 158. See id. (detailing the three-step analysis). 
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B. Accident Reconstruction 
A biomechanical expert must discover the severity of forces 
in an accident before creating a computer simulation or 
comparing forces against injury thresholds.159 Accident 
reconstruction involves “collecting information about a collision, 
appl[ying] standard engineering principles to this information, 
and determin[ing] the most probable sequence of events.”160 Many 
of the basic techniques of accident reconstruction are well 
settled.161 
Other commentators have discussed various accident 
reconstruction methodologies in detail.162 For the purposes of this 
Note, it is sufficient to mention that accident reconstruction 
testimony is often admitted unless, for example, it relies on 
photographs of vehicle damage, experience, or data that is plainly 
incorrect.163 Results of the accident reconstruction are used as 
inputs for the next phases of the three-step analysis,164 so 
inaccurate accident reconstruction methods will render the entire 
analysis unreliable.165 
                                                                                                     
 159. See id. (outlining the three-step approach to biomechanical analyses, 
with the first two steps conducted for the purpose of calculating forces). 
 160. Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 161. See 9 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, PROOF OF FACTS 115, § 12 (3d ed. 1990) 
(listing equations commonly used in accident reconstruction). 
 162. See id. (detailing aspects of accident reconstruction, including 
admissibility under Daubert, and collecting cases). 
 163. See, e.g., Clemente v. Blumenberg, 705 N.Y.S.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1999) (applying both the Frye and Daubert standards to find that “[u]sing 
repair costs and photographs as a method for calculating the change in velocity 
of two vehicles at impact is not a generally accepted method in any relevant 
field of engineering or under the laws of physics”); Reali v. Mazda Motor of Am., 
Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77 (D. Me. 2000) (finding accident reconstruction 
opinions unreliable where the expert “derived the 12 m.p.h. figure in large part 
from eyeballing accident photographs”). 
 164. See Krishnan et al., supra note 83, at 910 (noting that crash severity, 
which is within the scope of accident reconstruction, includes “many factors such 
as the direction of impact force, impact speed, crush characteristics of the 
impact area, etc.,” which are used as inputs when simulating occupant 
movements). 
 165. See Reali v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77–78 (D. 
Me. 2000) (excluding biomechanical engineer expert testimony as irrelevant 
after concluding that the engineer’s method of “eyeballing” photographs to 
estimate delta-V based on his experience was unreliable and stating that delta-
V is “[a]n important data point” in creating a simulation). 
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C. Simulation of Kinematics 
While accident reconstruction is within the realm of 
engineering, “[t]he study of occupant motion . . . is generally in 
the realm of biomedical science.”166 To simulate body movement 
and forces, experts rely on complex computer programs that 
apply the laws of physics in virtual environments.167 These 
computer programs allow researchers to perform parametric 
studies to test vehicle design and safety features without the cost 
and time otherwise necessary to build parts and crash vehicles.168 
The distinct features, measurements, weights and stiffness 
values of each make and model of vehicle must be input into this 
virtual environment using defined contact surfaces.169 In 
addition, minute details like seatbelt material or the seatbelt 
spooling response must be included in the simulation.170  
The virtual occupants in these programs exist as ellipsoids 
connected by joints; for example, one ellipsoid represents a head 
while another represents a neck, and a mathematical formula 
defines the interaction between the two.171 The properties of 
these ellipsoids are based on crash test dummies and are scaled 
to different sizes using measurements from anthropometry 
surveys.172 It goes without saying that this method is imperfect. 
For example, it is impossible to model the movement of the seven 
vertebrae of a human neck with a single ellipsoid.173 This 
modelling is even more unreasonable when the plaintiff, like Mrs. 
                                                                                                     
 166. Krishnan et al., supra note 83, at 910. 
 167. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 69 (describing computer simulation 
programs). 
 168. Terry D. Day & Randall L. Hargens, Application and Misapplication of 
Computer Programs for Accident Reconstruction, SAE TECH. PAPER 890738, Feb. 
1, 1989, at 129 (noting the uses of computer programs by government agencies, 
vehicle manufacturers, police, and insurance companies). 
 169. See Michael B. James et al., Limitations of ATB/CVS as an Accident 
Reconstruction Tool, SAE TECH. PAPER 971045, Feb. 24, 1997, at 1 (discussing 
the process of building a computer simulation). 
 170. See id. at 6 (discussing the difficulties of simulating seat belts). 
 171. See id. at 1 (discussing the process of building a computer simulation). 
 172. See id. at 6 (describing the process of compiling data for simulation 
ellipsoids). 
 173. See id. (“The joint parameters which are most critical in evaluating 
occupant injury exposure are also the most difficult to define; namely those 
characterizing the neck.”). 
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Crandall in the Introduction, has fusions or other 
irregularities.174 
1. Computer Program Validity and Peer Review 
When considering the admissibility of opinions based on 
computer simulations, courts should first ensure that the 
program has been validated in peer-reviewed literature for the 
type of incident the expert is attempting to model.175 Due to 
simplifications that must be made to create a computer model, 
even a generally accepted computer simulation program that is 
“based on the laws of physics and accepted principles of accident 
reconstruction[] is not a reliable methodology in all factual 
circumstances.”176 Without validation, courts cannot determine 
whether a computer model reliably simulates the accident at 
issue.177  
2. Error Rate and the “Fit” of a Simulation to the Facts of a Case 
Validation studies for some of the most prominent programs 
have reported rates of error as low as 2% to 17%.178 While some 
courts have admitted opinions on the strength of these error rates 
alone,179 judges should also consider whether the computer 
                                                                                                     
 174. See supra Part I (setting forth the story of Mrs. Crandall). 
 175. See Turner v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07 Civ. 163, 2007 WL 
2713062, at *3–4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2007) (finding a computer simulation 
program validated where it was subject to peer review and publication, has 
known error rates, and is generally accepted by the relevant scientific 
community). 
 176. Valente v. Textron, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 409, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 177. See id. (excluding opinions based on a computer simulation where the 
expert failed to show that the program had been tested or validated in any way 
for a scenario similar to the crash at issue). 
 178. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 69 (listing published error rates for 
the Engineering Dynamics Simulation Model of Automobile Collisions and the 
ATB). 
 179. See, e.g., Melberg v. Plains Mktg., L.P., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1258, 
1261 (D.N.D. 2004) (finding the use of the ATB computer simulation “somewhat 
suspect” but allowing opinions based on the simulation because the computer 
program was relied on by the Air Force and government agencies). 
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program is capable of fitting the facts of their specific case and 
whether the expert’s opinion takes into account the limitations of 
the simulation.180 
As an illustration of the limitations of computer simulations, 
authors of one validation study commented that “[t]he 
passenger’s injuries were . . . difficult to compare because of the 
ejection and their severity. While severe injuries were evident in 
both the accident and simulation, the multiple impacts make it 
hard to determine the exact causes.”181 The authors concluded 
that “[a]lthough [the simulations] may not exactly reconstruct the 
accident events, they do provide likely occupant responses that 
can be used in parameter studies investigating injury 
countermeasures.”182 
In another example, researchers validating the “Articulated 
Total Body” model (ATB) produced a reasonably good modeling of 
occupant responses but noted the need for sufficient input data to 
obtain the desired results.183 The authors concluded that 
“significant variations . . . result from moderate changes in the 
initial position of the occupant’s body and his seat and angular 
configuration”184 and that the simulation was “capable of 
delivering reasonable peak-level acceleration results and 
approximate time intervals, once appropriate vehicle and 
occupant mass, stiffness, energy dissipation, seat back and 
occupant position data are input.”185 Computer models require 
thousands of input parameters to produce results with levels of 
accuracy that compare with the rates of error published in 
validation studies.186 Many more variables are available during 
                                                                                                     
 180. See Day & Hargens, supra note 168, at 136 (warning that validated 
computer programs can be unreliable when misused). 
 181. See Huaining Cheng et al., ATB Model Simulation of a Rollover 
Accident with Occupant Ejection, SAE TECH. PAPER 950134, Feb. 1, 1995, at 30 
(describing the collision and injuries). 
 182. Id. 
 183. I.U. Ojalvo & H. Yanowitz, Vehicle and Occupant Response to Low 
Speed Impact: Comparison of Analysis with Test and Parametric Study, SAE 
TECH. PAPER 980300, Feb. 23, 1998, at 4 (noting that only one of several 
controlled crash tests provided enough inputs to perform the study). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1. 
 186. See James et al., supra note 169, at 1 (noting that the Articulated Total 
Body (ATB) program contains between 3,000 and 7,000 parameters). 
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controlled laboratory validations than exist in real-world 
investigations.187 
Validation studies suggest two ways experts could misuse 
computer simulations. First, an expert might represent that a 
simulation shows the way an accident actually occurred or how 
an individual actually moved during a collision, rather than just 
one possible way the occupant might have moved.188 Second, an 
expert might rely on a simulation that lacks sufficient input 
data.189 
To avoid misuse, scholars have recommended that experts 
run a series of simulations to test for sensitivity to error 
attributable to missing variables and present data as a range of 
possible results.190 Despite these suggestions, many courts have 
not excluded opinions based on computer simulations despite 
apparent deficiencies, reasoning that defects go to the weight and 
not admissibility of the expert’s opinion.191 Still, judges should be 
wary of opinions based on computer simulations where there is 
simply “too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion.”192  
                                                                                                     
 187. See id. (noting that many of the input parameters may not be available 
for real-world collisions); L.A. Obergefell, I. Kaleps & A.K. Johnson, Prediction 
of an Occupant’s Motion During Rollover Crashes, SAE TECH. PAPER 861876, 
Oct. 1986, at 14 (stating that “considerable information is required for the 
simulation of a crash test” and listing necessary parameters). 
 188. See Day & Hargens, supra note 168, at 136 (warning against the use of 
a single simulation to represent the only way a crash could have happened). 
 189. See Valente v. Textron, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 409, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(excluding a computer simulation of a roll-over accident in part due to 
simplifications in the operation of the model).  
 190. See Day & Hargens, supra note 168, at 136 (listing recommendations to 
guard against the erroneous use of computer programs by forensic experts). 
 191. See, e.g., Melberg v. Plains Mktg., L.P., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1258, 
1261 (D.N.D. 2004) (finding the use of the ATB computer simulation “somewhat 
suspect” and stating that “[t]he expert opinions are weak but, . . . the 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence is through cross-
examination”); Burke v. TranSam Trucking, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335 
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (“Defendants’ arguments and criticisms of Dr. Ziejewski’s 
methodology and inputs used went more to the weight of the evidence, rather 
than to his ability to testify as an expert in this case.”). 
 192. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (recognizing that 
“[t]rained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data,” but this does not 
warrant admitting opinion based “only by the ipse dixit of the expert”). 
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D. Comparison to Documented Injury Thresholds 
The two methods discussed above culminate in the 
approximation of forces applied to anatomical regions.193 The 
final step in the three-step biomechanical analysis involves the 
comparison of those forces against documented injury 
thresholds.194  
1. The Nature of Biomechanical Injury Thresholds 
Biomechanical injury thresholds are based on experimental 
studies that aim to uncover causal links and risk curves in 
populations.195 Researchers attempting to discover human injury 
thresholds encounter a paradox: the thresholds can be properly 
tested “only by using the human subject, but the tests cannot be 
performed in a manner to jeopardize his well-being or life.”196 
Because controlled tests of humans are often ethically impossible, 
researchers have resorted to testing cadavers,197 live volunteers 
in limited circumstances,198 and animals.199 Researchers then 
                                                                                                     
 193. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 68 (outlining a three-step approach 
to biomechanical analyses, with the first two steps conducted for the purpose of 
calculating forces). 
 194. See id. (outlining the three-step method). 
 195. See id. at 58–60 (discussing several statistical injury risk curves). 
 196. See Edwin Hendler et al., Effect of Head and Body Position and 
Muscular Tensing on Response to Impact, in HUMAN SUBJECT CRASH TESTING: 
INNOVATIONS AND ADVANCES 218 (Lawrence S. Nordhoff Jr., Michael D. Freeman 
& Gunter P. Siegmund eds., 2007) (discussing the difficulties of testing 
automotive protective equipment). 
 197. See Suanez v. Egeland, 801 A.2d 1186, 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002) (“The only specific scientific tests to which Thibault referred were 
performed either upon cadavers or upon military personnel under controlled 
conditions . . . .”); see also Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 903 A.2d 1068, 1074 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 942 A.2d 769 (2006) (noting that the biomechanical 
engineer had “conducted experiments with cadaver parts, determining the 
strength of various materials making up the musculoskeletal system”). 
 198. See, e.g., Suanez, 801 A.2d at 1193 (referencing tests on military 
personnel under controlled conditions).  
 199. See W. N. Newberry et al., Analysis of Acute Mechanical Insult in an 
Animal Model of Post-Traumatic Osteoarthrosis, 120 J. BIOMECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING 704, 704–06 (1998) (using rabbits to study the effect of chronic 
degeneration of cartilage and bone after exposure to forces exceeding a 
threshold of injury); see also Liying Zhang, King H. Yang & Albert I. King, A 
HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE? 1097 
attempt to match those tests with observations of trauma victims 
in the general population.200  
Another way of gathering data for an injury threshold is to 
outfit a group of subjects with accelerometers, subject them to 
traumatic forces, and “normaliz[e] the injury incidence data by 
the . . . exposure data.”201 Importantly, biomechanical engineers 
gathering data typically rely on medical doctors to determine 
whether subjects were actually injured during the test and what 
injuries were sustained.202 Some injury thresholds are relatively 
well-established in the field of biomechanics and have been used 
outside the litigation context.203 Other thresholds are tentative.204 
2. The Reliability of Injury Causation Opinions Based on Injury 
Thresholds 
The reliability of a forensic biomechanical analysis depends 
on whether results of population-based studies can be 
extrapolated with accuracy to specific individuals and 
circumstances.205 The practice of forensic epidemiology employs 
                                                                                                     
Proposed Injury Threshold for Traumatic Brain Injury, 126 J. BIOMECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING 226, 226 (2004) (noting that existing head injury criteria were 
based on “head acceleration results from animal concussion tests and cadaveric 
skull fractures”). 
 200. See Augenstein & Digges, supra note 23, at 1–2 (discussing 
biomechanical engineer’s collection of data gleaned from patients suffering 
traumatic injuries). For example, the Nij, a neck injury criterion, was “originally 
derived from porcine neck testing” and was “then matched to injuries observed 
in real world non-rollover frontal crashes.” Freeman & Kohles, Forensic 
Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 462. 
 201. See id. at 343–45, 356–57 (2007) (gathering head impact data from 
sixty-four football players over four years and proposing a modification to 
current mild traumatic brain injury risk curves). 
 202. See id. at 345 (“Impacts were classified as injurious based on a 
diagnosis of concussion by the team physician.”). 
 203. See Hayes et al., supra note 33, at 58–60, 62–62 (discussing the 
Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), Head Injury Criterion (HIC), and the Neck 
Injury Criteria (NIC) and their uses). 
 204. See Funk et al., supra note 143, at 359 (noting that “50% risk levels for 
concussion cannot be calculated reliably because the exposure data are 
extremely sparse” and stating that proposed injury curves for concussion “are 
only a first attempt at calculating injury assessment risk values from limited 
injury data”). 
 205. See Freeman & Kohles, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 69 
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population-based data “as a basis for evaluating the consistency 
of findings in an individual case with what is plausibly associated 
with a particular injury mechanism.”206 The appeal of 
epidemiological evidence in personal injury cases is that it can be 
adapted easily to the 50%-plus probability standard familiar to 
courts.207 A probability derived from epidemiological evidence is 
known as relative risk.208 For purposes of illustration, imagine a 
box filled with balls. A sampling test shows that 60% are blue and 
the others are white. In this example, the relative risk that one 
will randomly select a blue ball from the box is 60%.209 Once the 
ball has been selected, however, the relative risk does not matter 
because the ball is either blue or white.210 Statisticians have 
commented that “there is no logically rigorous definition of what 
a statement of probability means with reference to an individual 
instance.”211 
a. Testability 
Outside of litigation, injury risk curves can be tested and 
revised, at least in limited ways, by comparing predictions of 
injury based on biomechanical risk curves against actual injuries 
observed in subjects.212 Some—if not most—forensic applications 
                                                                                                     
(discussing the difficulties of extrapolating from biomechanical literature to 
specific cases). 
 206. Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra note 18, 
at 459. 
 207. Id. at 611. 
 208. See id. (discussing the use of relative risk to make statements about the 
probability of individual causation). For a more thorough discussion of the role 
of relative risk in causation determinations, see Laubach, supra note 91, at 
1036–39.   
 209. Id. at 611 n.188 (illustrating relative risk and describing frequentist 
statisticians’ opposition to subjective probability statements). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Lee Loevinger, On Logic and Sociology, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 527, 530 
(1992). The same principle is true in toxic torts, where the use of relative risk 
may be “misleading when a plaintiff has a genetic or epigenetic susceptibility to 
a particular substance.”  Laubach, supra note 91, at 1039. 
 212. See, e.g., Funk et al., supra note 143, at 345 (testing and proposing 
modifications to an injury risk curve based on observations of injuries in a study 
and noting that “[i]mpacts were classified as injurious based on a diagnosis of 
concussion by the team physician”). 
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of the three-step biomechanical analysis also rely on medical 
doctors’ diagnoses to test the accuracy of the analysis.213 
Ironically, biomechanical experts in litigation regularly critique 
medical doctors’ diagnoses.214 But without deferring to medical 
doctors, there is no way to test the application of a biomechanical 
expert’s forensic analysis. It is impossible to acquire samples of 
the materials at issue—the plaintiff’s tissue or bones—to test the 
expert’s method by calculating the plaintiff’s true tolerance to 
injury.215 A lack of ability to test the forensic biomechanical 
method weighs against the admission of specific injury causation 
opinions.216 
b. Peer Review 
Forensic biomechanical analyses have been used outside 
litigation to examine likely mechanisms of injuries in deceased 
subjects,217 and to opine whether safety features such as seat 
belts might have mitigated injuries.218 These studies often use 
the three-step analysis used by biomechanical experts in 
litigation.219 Very few or none of these studies, however, attempt 
to determine whether an individual was actually injured.220 
                                                                                                     
 213. See ROBERT A. GALGANSKI ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 
ADMIN., CRASH VISUALIZATION USING REAL-WORLD ACCELERATION DATA 1 (2001) 
(comparing injuries in medical records with injury predictions based on 
computer simulations). 
 214. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing biomechanical 
engineers’ critiques of medical doctors’ causation opinions). 
 215. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility 
of measuring or testing individual injury thresholds). 
 216. See, e.g., Berry v. Crown Equip. Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 754 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000) (noting that “courts interpreting Daubert have considered 
testability of the expert’s theory to be the most important of the four factors”). 
 217. See Ejlersen et al., supra note 31, at 464 (describing a joint medical and 
biomechanical investigation to discover traumatology and a potential cause of 
death). 
 218. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 23, at 15 (discussing the 
benefit of computer simulations created by biomechanical engineers of a school 
bus roll-over as a tool “to evaluate specific mechanical and biomechanical issues 
for similar types of accidents”). 
 219. See Hayes et al., supra note 33 at 68–69 (citing peer-reviewed and 
published studies that employed the three-step analysis). 
 220. See infra notes 221–223 and accompanying text (discussing cases cited 
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Instead, these studies use the three-step analysis to predict the 
effect of seat belt use,221 to show that computer simulations’ 
predictions compare reasonably well to actual occupant dynamics 
and to injuries previously diagnosed by medical doctors,222 or to 
predict whether proposed design and safety features in 
automobiles and aircraft might reduce the potential for human 
injury.223 In these studies, the biomechanical analysis is not used 
to dispute the medical doctor’s injury causation opinion but 
rather to explain how the trauma might have caused the 
injuries.224 In other words, the three-step biomechanical analysis 
is used most often outside of litigation “after a causal 
determination has been made, as a means of explaining 
injuries.”225  
In sum, the three-step biomechanical analysis has been 
accepted by the biomechanical community and appears in peer-
reviewed literature, but it has not been applied for the same 
purpose that it is being used in litigation.226 This presents a 
                                                                                                     
by Wilson C. Hayes, Ph.D., as supporting the three-step analysis as a method 
for determining specific injury causation). 
 221. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 23, at 15 (discussing the 
benefit of computer simulations created by biomechanical engineers of a school 
bus roll-over as a tool “to evaluate specific mechanical and biomechanical issues 
for similar types of accidents”). 
 222. See Kennerly H. Digges, Reconstruction of Frontal Accidents Using the 
CVS-3D Model, SAE TECH. PAPER 840869, Apr. 1, 1984, at 1–2 (“The results 
computed by the model are quite reasonable when compared with the injuries 
received by the occupant.”); C. Clark, Simulation of Road Crash Facial 
Lacerations By Broken Windshields, SAE TECH. PAPER 870320, Feb. 23, 1987, at 
1–3 (“The physical simulations approximated the damage observed in the three 
accidents.”). 
 223. See L. Obergefell, Computer Simulation Of Human Body Dynamics, 2 J. 
GRAVITATIONAL PHYSIOLOGY 92, 92–93 (1995) (noting the usefulness of this 
methodology in testing safety features due to the constraints in testing actual 
human subjects); NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., 15-PASSENGER CHILD CARE VAN 
RUN-OFF-ROAD ACCIDENT MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 45–46 (Apr. 4, 2002) (using 
biomechanical principles and computer simulations to conclude that the use of a 
different vehicle and the proper use of child restraints could have mitigated 
injuries in a crash). 
 224. See Ejlersen et al., supra note 31, at 463–65 (describing a 
biomechanical analysis as an adjunct to a medical investigation regarding 
traumatology and cause of death in an individual). 
 225. Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra note 18, 
at 460 (emphasis in original). 
 226. See supra notes 222–225 and accompanying text (collecting studies 
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danger that biomechanical experts’ specific causation opinions 
are based on a method that does not justify their conclusions.227 
c. Error Rate 
The second step of the three-step analysis is the only method 
that has published error rates.228 Courts should avoid conflating 
the error rates of computer simulations with biomechanical 
experts’ methods of predicting injury. Because there are no 
published error rates for the other methods in the three-step 
biomechanical analysis, courts should consider implicit error rate 
issues, including validity, specificity, and accuracy.229 
Regarding validity, inferences drawn from experimental 
studies “are justified only when the sample is representative.”230 
The subjects of biomechanical studies are often not 
representative of the larger population.231 The confidence in an 
extrapolation from biomechanical studies to a different 
population—let alone a unique individual—is low because 
biomechanical engineers cannot quantify “outside factors that 
would or would not affect the outcome,”232 such as pre-existing 
injury, lifestyle, age, sex, and other factors.233  
                                                                                                     
employing the three-step biomechanical analysis and describing the purposes of 
those studies). 
 227. See Meixner & Diamond, supra note 65, at 1090 (noting that experts 
err when they “base[] an opinion on some scientifically derived data, but those 
data could not justify the conclusion that was drawn”). 
 228. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (listing published rates of 
error for computer simulation programs). 
 229. See Meixner & Diamond, supra note 65, at 1067 (stating that where 
numerical error rates are unavailable, “the judge must examine the 
methodology for flaws that are likely to produce errors”). 
 230. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 84, § 6:8. 
 231. See infra notes 272–273 and accompanying text (discussing the 
inability of biomechanical studies to contain the quantity and types of subjects 
or conditions that reflect those seen in the real world).  
 232. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 23:18. 
 233. See Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Del. 2004) (stating that 
“[t]he use of applied physics by trained engineers aided by computer 
simulations . . . does create indicia of reliability” but that “[i]f the crash test 
dummy or a member of the control group is replaced with an uniquely 
susceptible driver, those indicia of reliability become a facade”). 
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Forensic biomechanical methods may also lack specificity 
because many injury risk curves are based on anatomical regions 
and do not distinguish between specific injuries. For example, the 
Head Injury Criterion “does not distinguish among types of head 
injuries such as skull fractures, subdural hematoma, [or] diffuse 
axonal injury.”234 In addition, the computer simulations used by 
biomechanical engineers can only estimate forces applied to 
anatomical regions (represented by ellipsoids) instead of specific 
anatomic structures.235  
With regard to accuracy, relative risk calculations are known 
to result in false positives and false negatives. For example, 
researchers who proposed a risk curve for mild traumatic brain 
injury observed that one of the subjects suffered a concussion 
after a hit generating forces below the proposed 1% mark, while 
some sustained much higher impacts without injury.236 The 
researchers stated that “[t]he variation in injury tolerance 
between individuals explains why high severity impacts cause 
[mild traumatic brain injury] in some players but not others.”237  
In another context, biomechanical engineers hired by the 
National Transportation Safety Board to analyze school bus 
crashworthiness gathered data and simulated bus accidents 
using five different computer programs.238 The biomechanical 
engineers compared predicted injuries against actual injuries 
sustained.239 The biomechanical experts’ methods failed to predict 
the actual injuries sustained by two of six occupants analyzed in 
one crash, and predicted thorax injuries for a third occupant who, 
                                                                                                     
 234. Steven C. Batterman & Scott D. Batterman, Forensic Engineering and 
Science, in FORENSIC SCIENCE AND LAW: INVESTIGATIVE APPLICATIONS IN 
CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND FAMILY JUSTICE 566 (Cyril H. Wecht & John T. Rago eds., 
2006). 
 235. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 466 (“[A] precise or even rough estimate of the magnitude, direction, 
and rate of load sustained at a given disk level may be virtually impossible to 
determine given the number of unknown variables required to accurately 
reconstruct the intraspinal loads induced by the collision.”). 
 236. See Funk et al., supra note 143, at 350 (reporting study results). 
 237. Id. at 358. 
 238. See NAT’L TRANP. SAFETY BD., HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT: 
BUS CRASHWORTHINESS 5–6, 15–16 (Sept. 21, 1999) (stating the goals of the 
research and explaining the simulation methodology). 
 239. See id. at 23 tbl.3 (comparing actual and predicted injuries). 
HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE? 1103 
in reality, suffered no injury.240 These are only a few examples of 
the inaccuracy of relative risk opinions.241 Yet without an error 
rate, one has no way of understanding how often a biomechanical 
analysis will produce a false positive or negative.242 
In sum, considerations of validity, specificity, and accuracy 
weigh against the reliability of the three-step analysis when used 
as evidence of specific injury causation. The three-step analysis is 
capable of calculating relative risk of injury based on proposed 
thresholds, but its ability to predict the actual outcome is 
suspect.243 These considerations weigh against the reliability of 
specific causation opinions and support scientists’ arguments that 
relative risk should play “a highly circumscribed role in 
evaluating causation.”244  
d. Advisory Committee Notes Factors 
This Subsection applies the five considerations in the 
Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702 in the order they are listed 
in Part III.B.2.245 First, a biomechanical engineer is most likely to 
testify about matters growing out of research independent of 
litigation when he or she testifies regarding injury causation 
generally. Some biomechanical experts have conducted 
experimental tests related to injury thresholds or injury 
                                                                                                     
 240. See id. (same). 
 241. See Allan F. Tencer et al., Femur Fractures in Relatively Low Speed 
Frontal Crashes: The Possible Role of Muscle Forces, 34 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
PREVENTION, 1, 7 (2002) (listing femur fractures suffered at forces supposed to 
have only a 17% to 27% probability of injury according to biomechanical 
thresholds); Batterman & Batterman, supra note 234, at 566 (“[I]t is possible for 
a person to walk away uninjured from an accident with an HIC greater than 
1000 while a person can die from a head injury in a crash where the HIC was 
significantly less than 1000.”). 
 242. See Freeman & Kolhes, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 70 
(examining problematic error rates in forensic biomechanics analyses). 
 243. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 467 (“Forensic biomechanical analysis is a useful adjunctive tool in 
forensic medicine, however limitations in its use must be acknowledged and 
heeded, otherwise the potential for erroneous application arises.”). 
 244. Id. at 459.  
 245. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (listing considerations for 
reliability included in the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702). 
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mechanics.246 These studies, however, are population-based. 
Unlike medical doctors, biomechanical engineers outside of 
litigation do not determine whether or not a specific incident 
actually caused an individual’s injuries, except when a 
biomechanical analysis is an adjunct to medical studies.247 
Second, there is a danger of unjustifiable extrapolation 
because injury risk curves were originally developed to help 
designers “create equipment, rules, and operating procedures” 
that reduce the risk of injury, not as a means of judging whether 
a specific trauma was the cause of an individual’s injuries.248 The 
risk of unjustified extrapolation is at its highest when 
biomechanical engineers extrapolate general data to plaintiffs 
and circumstances dissimilar from the test subjects and 
circumstances in the biomechanical literature.249 
Third, biomechanical engineers cannot identify or rule out 
other obvious causes of injury because they lack the medical 
expertise to identify pre-existing injuries and diseases that can 
contribute to or cause injury.250  
                                                                                                     
 246. Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 766 (Wash. App. 2012) (noting that a 
biomechanical expert had received government grants to research mechanisms 
of cervical injuries and that the expert had conducted tests aimed at developing 
improved car seat head restraints for prevention of impact injuries). 
 247. See, e.g., Ejlersen et al., supra note 31, at 463–65 (describing a joint 
biomechanical analysis adjunct to a medical investigation of traumatology and 
cause of death). 
 248. Charles F. Babbs, A New Biomechanical Head Injury Criterion, 6 J. 
MECHANICS MED. & BIOLOGY 349, 350 (2006); see also Batterman & Batterman, 
supra note 234, at 565–66 (explaining that injury thresholds entered the law 
when the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 introduced the 
concept of vehicle crashworthiness and required designers to comply with 
certain injury criteria); Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) 
(“[T]he court questioned the validity of using a series of tests designed for one 
purpose (designing cars) for a different purpose (assessing a threshold of applied 
force for injury in rear-end car accident).”). 
 249. See Tittsworth v. Robinson, 475 S.E.2d 261, 263–64 (Va. 1996) 
(excluding biomechanical expert testimony where there was “no proof that these 
experiments were conducted under circumstances substantially similar to those 
existing at the accident scene”). 
 250. See Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1231 (Del. 2004) (finding Lawrence 
Thibault, D.Sc. incompetent to take into account a plaintiff’s pre-existing 
condition and proclivity to further injury where he did not review medical 
records or examine the plaintiff and stating that no evidence suggested “that 
any expert in his field would be competent, or would have taken the opportunity 
to do so”). 
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Fourth, there is a danger that biomechanical experts 
employed as litigation consultants do not employ the same rigor 
as biomechanical researchers in the field.251 For example, 
biomechanical experts typically rely on a single simulation 
attempt to show the way an accident occurred, while researchers 
in the field use a range of studies to account for missing 
variables, use multiple computer programs to verify simulation 
results, or at least make known the assumptions and limitations 
of their methodologies.252  
Fifth, the biomechanical field is relied upon outside of 
litigation to predict injury in populations, not in individuals.253 In 
addition, there is no consensus in the field of biomechanics that 
injury thresholds reliably measure actual injuries,254 especially 
under circumstances different than the test circumstances.255 
These factors also weigh against the reliability of biomechanical 
experts’ specific causation opinions when based on the three-step 
forensic biomechanical method. 
                                                                                                     
 251. See Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at xv  
I’m being asked here to render an opinion whether a singular event 
caused a set of alleged injuries in a particular person. That is 
generally not the intent of the papers that I have either submitted, or 
I have served as the editor of a journal and reviewed literally 
thousands of them. It’s a different setting entirely. 
 252. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 23, at 16–17, 80–81 (noting 
that researchers used two computer simulation programs and listing the 
researchers’ data input assumptions and the limitations of their computer 
simulations). 
 253. See id. at 23 tbl.3 (acknowledging discrepancies between predicted and 
diagnosed injuries and relying on medical diagnoses as the actual injuries 
suffered by the occupants). 
 254. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (noting a trial 
court’s finding that there “is great controversy in the field about the quality and 
comparability of [biomechanical] tests” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Wach & Unarski, supra note 25, at 136 (explaining that, although 
biomechanical literature on falls is extensive, it is concerned primarily with 
statistical data which “are not directly applicable in individual cases”). 
 255. See Freeman & Kohles, Forensic Biomechanics, supra note 30, at 462 
(noting that the Nij risk curve was “originally derived from porcine neck testing” 
and “has not been validated for injury mechanisms outside of frontal traffic 
collisions”; therefore, “any use of the metric for other injury mechanisms should 
be approached with caution”). 
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3. The Reliability of General Injury Causation Opinions 
General causation opinions are more directly related to the 
biomechanical literature, require less extrapolation, and better 
reflect biomechanical opinions offered outside of litigation.256 
Biomechanical expert testimony that claims to rule out the 
possibility of injury in any human at a given force, however, 
raises special reliability concerns.257 
a. Opinions Ruling Out Causation Based on “Activities of Daily 
Living” Theories 
For some parts of the body, such as arteries, no injury 
threshold has been proposed.258 When no published threshold 
exists, some biomechanical experts have testified that forces 
associated with “activities of daily living” can substitute as a 
threshold below which no injury to any anatomic structure is 
likely.259 Researchers have measured forces associated with 
coughing, stepping off a curb, skipping rope, and lifting.260 Some 
researchers have attempted to bolster the “activities of daily 
                                                                                                     
 256. See, e.g., Wilcox v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2007 WL 
1576708, at *12 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 2007) (allowing general causation opinions 
and noting that the plaintiffs conceded that biomechanical engineers may be 
qualified to testify to risk factors in general). 
 257. See infra Part V.C.3.a (discussing the weaknesses of opinions ruling out 
causation). 
 258. See Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, Exhibit A at 22 (recording 
the following statement made by Wilson C. Hayes, Ph.D. in response to a 
deposition question regarding the existence of an arterial injury threshold: “At 
the level of forces necessary, I don’t know, and believe no data are available”). 
 259. See id. at 31–32 (“[I]f the forces are well within activities of daily living, 
our literature tells us, basically, you can’t establish that the event caused the 
injury.”); Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 850 (Colo. App. 2000) (noting proffered 
biomechanical evidence “related to the results of automobile collision 
experiments with human volunteers; specifically, the resulting threshold of force 
below which a person probably could not be injured in a rear-end automobile 
collision”). 
 260. See Schultz, 13 P.3d at 852 (listing “activities of daily living” used by a 
biomechanical expert to support his causation opinion); see also James R. Funk 
et al., Head and Neck Loading in Everyday and Vigorous Activities, 39 ANNALS 
BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 766, 767 (2011) (collecting data from activities, 
including soccer ball impact, self-imposed hand strike to the forehead, chair tip, 
“chair plop,” vigorous head shake, seated drop, and jump off a step). 
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living” threshold with bumper car experiments and low speed 
crash tests.261 One prominent biomechanical expert has testified 
that “if the forces are well within activities of daily living, our 
literature tells us, basically, you can’t establish that the event 
caused the injury.”262 This type of opinion attacks a criterion of 
general causation known as plausibility.263 
(1) Problems with Establishing Implausibility 
The first problem with this type of opinion is the misuse of 
the “plausibility” criterion. An injury is plausible when an 
exposure “could reasonably have caused the disease or injury 
outcome (regardless of how often).”264 Biomechanical engineers’ 
attack on the link between low-level force and injury commits the 
“fallacy of the transposed conditional by concluding that the 
absence of evidence of biomechanical plausibility of causation is 
equivalent to evidence of implausibility.”265  
In reality, plausibility “is met when there is a lack of 
established implausibility (impossibility).”266 Therefore, “[r]arity 
is not the same as implausibility.”267 Anecdotal evidence of 
injuries sustained at low levels of force supports an inference that 
injury at low levels of trauma does occur, although rarely.268 
Implausibility is only established when a theory of injury 
causation violates a fundamental biologic principle that is 
                                                                                                     
 261. See VINOD VIJAYAKUMAR ET AL., HEAD KINEMATICS AND UPPER NECK 
LOADING DURING SIMULATED LOW-SPEED REAR-END COLLISIONS: A COMPARISON 
WITH VIGOROUS ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING 2 (2006) (comparing head kinematics 
in bumper car collisions with low speed vehicle collision data in the 
biomechanical literature). 
 262. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, Exhibit A at 22. 
 263. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 463–64 (discussing biomechanical engineers’ use of Bradford Hill 
criteria with respect to general injury causation). 
 264. Id. at 463 (emphasis in original). 
 265. Id. at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 266. Id. at 462 (emphasis in original). 
 267. Id. 
 268. See, e.g., Doré DeBartolo, A Case of Cauda Equina Syndrome Caused by 
a Simple Sneeze, 3 OSTEOPATHIC FAM. PHYSICIAN 27, 27 (concluding that a 
sneeze was the inciting event for nerve compression in the spine of a patient 
with pre-existing lumbar spine conditions).  
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universally accepted and incontrovertible.269 One example is the 
principle that trauma cannot cause “brain tumors to appear 
spontaneously overnight.”270 The body of “activities of daily 
living” studies is not substantial and convincing enough to 
establish implausibility.271 
(2) The Validity and Sufficiency of “Activities of Daily Living” 
Studies 
Most “activities of daily living” studies include between 
twenty and thirty subjects, suggesting that the studies may not 
have sufficient statistical power to exonerate a link between low-
level trauma and injury.272 These studies usually exclude subjects 
with pre-existing medical conditions or disease, as well as young 
and elderly subjects.273 The studies therefore “cannot contain the 
quantity and types of subjects and conditions that sufficiently 
represent the range of variety seen in real world subjects and 
conditions.”274  
In addition, selection bias plagues these experimental 
studies.275 True randomization is impossible because the subjects 
                                                                                                     
 269. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 463 (“Implausibility is only established when cause and effect is 
ruled out because of the violation of a fundamental biologic principle . . . .”). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 23:4 (noting that negative 
epidemiological evidence must be so strong that it cannot be rebutted by reliable 
and scientifically valid methodologies).  
 272. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (noting a trial 
court’s finding that the statistical sample in tests used by a biomechanical 
engineer was “extremely low”); see also VIJAYAKUMAR ET AL., supra note 261, at 3 
(conducting a study on thirty volunteer subjects); Funk et al., supra note 260, at 
767 (conducting a study on twenty volunteer subjects). 
 273. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 615 (discussing the 
problems of using probabilities when two agents may combine to increase the 
probability of causation). 
 274. Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra note 18, 
at 464; see also Batterman & Batterman, supra note 234, at 566 (noting that 
“normal biological variation across the population spectrum is not accounted for” 
in the research of injury thresholds). 
 275. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 464 (stating that the “effect of bias and scatter on the extrapolation 
of tolerance specifications” makes it difficult to establish implausibility with 
biomechanical experimental studies). 
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choose their own exposure rather than being randomly assigned 
to groups.276 Researchers in this area typically do not select 
control groups, making it impossible to compare differences 
between individuals who were subjected (or subjected 
themselves) to trauma and those who were not.277 In at least one 
of these studies, every test subject was an employee at a firm 
specializing in biomechanical forensics and consulting, and the 
subjects therefore may have had an interest in the outcome of the 
research.278  
Finally, the authors of one study reported that up to half of 
the participants dropped out before the study was complete.279 
Researchers have failed to investigate whether those who decline 
to participate in these studies or drop out before its completion 
differ significantly from those who do not.280 These deficiencies 
call into serious question the practice of generalizing the results 
of activities of daily living studies to populations and conditions 
outside the test subjects and circumstances.281  
                                                                                                     
 276. See Funk et al., supra note 260, at 767 (noting that the volunteer test 
subjects could choose not to participate in any activity). 
 277. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (referencing a 
trial court’s exclusion of a biomechanical expert’s opinions in part because there 
were “no controls among and between the experiments with regard to age, 
physical conditions [and] actual position of the body” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 84, § 6:9 (“[O]utcome figures from 
a treatment group without a control group generally reveal very little and can 
be misleading. Comparisons are essential.”). 
 278. See Funk et al., supra note 260, at 767 (noting that all twenty 
volunteers were selected from a pool of employee-volunteers at the Biodynamic 
Research Corporation). 
 279. See id. (noting that the study included twenty volunteers, only ten of 
which completed all tests in the study). 
 280. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 101, at 584 (explaining the need 
for further investigation when those selected to participate decline or drop out to 
avoid selection bias). 
 281. See Freeman & Kohles, Evaluation of Applied Biomechanics, supra 
note 18, at 464 (stating that studies “of animal, cadaver, and human volunteer 
subjects produce results that describe only a part of the spectrum of injury 
response to a nearly infinite range and combination of injury scenarios in the 
real world”). 
1110 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2016) 
b. Opinions Ruling Out Causation Based on Mechanisms of 
Injury 
Similarly, negative evidence regarding mechanisms of injury 
is usually insufficient to rule out causation. It is common for a 
single type of injury to have multiple potential triggering 
mechanisms.282 Mechanisms of injury based on researchers’ 
observations depend on the accuracy of subjects’ memory, and 
direct study of injury in live subjects is extremely limited by 
instrumentation technology and for ethical reasons.283 As a 
result, the suspected mechanics of many injuries are tentative or 
inexhaustive.284 In addition, biomechanical engineers frequently 
draw from medical literature to identify mechanisms of injury but 
are usually unqualified to rule out competing mechanisms of 
injury that involve disease or pre-existing conditions.285 These 
considerations show that biomechanical literature on 
mechanisms of injury is typically not sufficient to rule out injury 
causation.286 
                                                                                                     
 282. See, e.g., DeBartolo, supra note 268, at 27–28 (stating that the most 
common cause of Cauda Equina Syndrome is midline disc herniation, but that 
other causes include spinal metastases, hematoma, epidural abscess, traumatic 
compression, acute transverse myelitis, spinal stenosis, tumor, ankylosing 
spondylitis, following traction or spinal manipulation, after epidural steroid 
injection, or as a post-operative complication). 
 283. See Kashiro Ono & Koji Kaneoka, Motion Analysis of Human Cervical 
Vertebrae During Low Speed Rear Impacts by the Simulated Sled, reprinted in 
HUMAN SUBJECT CRASH TESTING: INNOVATIONS AND ADVANCES 758–59, 757 
(Lawrence S. Nordhoff Jr., Michael D. Freeman & Gunter P. Siegmund eds., 
2007) (noting the supervision of an ethics committee and limiting sled testing to 
staged collisions at less than four miles per hour).  
 284. Yu Shao et al., Blunt Liver Injury with Intact Ribs Under Impacts on 
the Abdomen: A Biomechanical Investigation, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2013) (“[T]he 
hidden kinematic interactions between the liver and other abdominal organs are 
impossible to measure using standard biomechanical instrumentation. So the 
actual process and biomechanism of blunt liver injury still remain 
inexhaustive.”). 
 285. See DeBartolo, supra note 268, at 27–28 (listing thirteen known 
mechanisms for Cauda Equina Syndrome, only a few of which involve direct 
trauma) 
 286. See Roach v. Hughes, No. 4:13-CV-00136-JHM, 2015 WL 3970739, at 
*12 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2015) (excluding a biomechanical engineer’s specific 
injury causation opinion that was based on the engineer’s testimony that the 
“accident did not provide a mechanism to produce the brachial plexus injury 
described in [the plaintiff’s] medical records”). 
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VI. The Helpfulness and Relevance of General Causation Opinions 
This Part applies the third prong of the Daubert analysis to 
biomechanical expert testimony. It discusses the helpfulness and 
relevance of general causation opinions in personal injury litigation 
and argues that otherwise admissible general causation opinions 
are not relevant in all cases and can be misleading and unfairly 
prejudicial when the plaintiff differs from test subjects in the 
biomechanical literature.  
Biomechanical engineers’ testimony regarding estimated forces 
in a collision may be helpful when the degree of trauma experienced 
is at issue in a case.287 Many courts have taken the position that—at 
least as a matter of probability—there is “a correlation between the 
nature of the vehicular impact and the severity of the personal 
injuries.”288 Therefore, some courts have found that evidence 
concerning the severity of the impact is relevant despite the fact 
that some “very minor impacts lead to serious personal injuries, and 
vice versa.”289 This rationale, however, may not apply in cases 
where the plaintiff’s injury could be caused at any level of trauma or 
could occur in the absence of trauma.290 
Whether similar forces create a heightened risk of injury in the 
general population may be relevant in some cases, such as Bowers, 
where the mechanism of injury is not well understood.291 In other 
cases involving traumatic injury, however, courts have found 
                                                                                                     
 287. See Schwartz v. Morrison, No. 12-CV-01001, 2013 WL 3216138, at *1 
(D. Colo. June 25, 2013) (allowing a biomechanical engineer to testify regarding 
accident reconstruction and the effects a pre-existing spinal condition might 
have on the plaintiff’s bodily movement during the accident, but not regarding 
the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries); Granville v. Howard, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0133, 
2012 WL 504197, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2012) (stating that a 
biomechanical engineer “was not required to opine whether Granville was 
actually injured in order to assist the jury”); Schneider v. Chickadel, No. 
02-1590-MPT, 2003 WL 21542318, at *1 n.2 (D. Del. July 8, 2003) (finding a 
biomechanical engineer’s testimony “relevant only to the biomechanics of the 
accident”). 
 288. Mason v. Lynch, 878 A.2d 588, 601 (Md. 2005). 
 289. Id. 
 290. For example, in Mrs. Crandall’s case, medical literature stated that 
injury to the carotid artery could be caused by slight trauma or may occur 
spontaneously. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion, supra note 1, at xvi–xix. 
 291. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting the need for general 
causation evidence in some cases where the mechanisms of injury are complex). 
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general or hypothetical causation opinions irrelevant and 
unhelpful,292 misleading,293 or even inappropriate attempts to 
bootstrap specific causation opinions.294 General causation 
opinions run the risk of confusing the issues “by shifting the fact 
finders’ attention from the particular to the universal.”295 General 
injury causation opinions, “while interesting, [are] irrelevant” 
because opinions based on biomechanical risk curves do not show 
whether or to what degree the plaintiff was in fact injured.296 
This is especially true when the plaintiff has pre-existing 
conditions or a special susceptibility to injury.297  
Other courts have found general causation opinions relevant 
and helpful,298 at least when the plaintiff has no special 
susceptibility to injury and is therefore more comparable to 
                                                                                                     
 292. See Boyd v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-108-TLS, 2011 WL 854350, 
at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2011) (“[T]he Defendant’s presentation of Elaine Serina, 
a biomechanical ergonomics expert, is not helpful to the Court because her 
testimony only concerns whole body vibrations generally and not the specific 
injury and causation allegations in this case.”). 
 293. See Schultz v. Wells, 13 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. App. 2000) (finding it 
within the trial court’s discretion to exclude two biomechanical engineers’ 
opinions based in part on a finding that they would mislead the jury).  
 294. See Mason v. Rizzi, 89 A.3d 32, 38 (Del. 2004) (stating that “[i]t would 
have been inappropriate and unhelpful, we think, for the biomechanical expert’s 
views about the effects of forces of impact upon people generally to be used as a 
basis to bootstrap a more particularized opinion” regarding the plaintiff’s spine); 
Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 764 (Wash. App. 2012) (affirming a trial 
court’s exclusion of biomechanical engineering testimony as unhelpful where the 
expert claimed to give general causation opinions, but where “his clear message 
was that Stedman could not have been injured in the accident because the force 
of the impact was too small”). 
 295. Mason, 89 A.3d at 37. 
 296. See Stedman, 292 P.3d at 768 (noting another trial court’s exclusion of 
general causation opinions as irrelevant, and merely attempts to draw an 
inference to specific causation); Schultz, 13 P.3d at 851 (“The court assessed the 
usefulness of presenting a probability theory to the jury, and concluded that 
such testimony would be confusing and misleading to the jury.”). 
 297. See Mason, 89 A.3d at 35 (reasoning that biomechanical opinions 
applying “activities of daily living” studies “would have resulted in juror 
speculation, confusion and unfair prejudice to Plaintiff” because the studies 
“were based on studies of normal spines”). 
 298. See Ma’Ele v. Arrington, 45 P.3d 557, 560 (Wash. App. 2002) (“Dr. 
Tencer, a biomechanical engineer, testified that a crash like this one generally 
does not cause injuries. Tencer has extensively studied low-speed 
collisions . . . . The jury was entitled to believe Tencer over any of the other 
witnesses.”). 
HOW SOUND IS THE SCIENCE? 1113 
subjects in the biomechanical literature.299 The broad discretion 
given to trial courts on this issue leaves room for disagreement 
about the helpfulness of biomechanical experts’ causation 
opinions based on the unique circumstances of each case.300 
VII. The Role of Biomechanical Expert Testimony in Court 
This Part proposes the scope of biomechanical expert 
testimony that should be admissible in typical personal injury 
litigation. It offers a roadmap for the application of Daubert in 
courts adopting either the Smelser or Eskin approach to 
biomechanical expert testimony.  
First, where this is an issue of first impression, courts should 
adopt Smelser’s distinction between general and specific 
causation when considering the scope of biomechanical 
expertise.301 This is appropriate because the field of 
biomechanics, like the fields of epidemiology and toxicology, is 
concerned with causality in populations.302 Unless a 
biomechanical engineer has medical expertise, courts should limit 
biomechanical expert testimony to general causation opinions 
because biomechanical engineers do not possess the expertise to 
make individual assessments or adapt generalized data to unique 
individuals.303  
General causation opinions include testimony that relates 
estimated forces of an accident to an injury threshold to show 
whether population-based evidence suggests a heightened risk of 
                                                                                                     
 299. See Mason, 89 A.3d at 36 (noting in dicta that when a plaintiff is within 
a normal range, “no rational 403 analysis would likely result in a conclusion 
that the jury would be misled or confused”).  
 300. See Stedman v. Cooper, 292 P.3d 764, 768 (Wash. App. 2012) (“The 
broad standard of abuse of discretion means that courts can reasonably reach 
different conclusions about whether, and to what extent, an expert’s testimony 
will be helpful to the jury in a particular case.”). 
 301. See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reasons supporting the Smelser approach to limiting biomechanical expert 
qualifications). 
 302. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (comparing the goals of 
experts in the fields of toxicology and biomechanics). 
 303. See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text (collecting cases 
requiring medical expertise to offer specific causation opinions). 
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injury.304 Specific causation opinions, on the other hand, focus on 
the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury and whether the 
injury was or was not caused by the collision.305 
In the event that a court adheres to the Eskin approach, a 
judge acting as gatekeeper should exclude opinions that concern 
the precise cause of a specific injury under Daubert’s reliability 
prong.306 Courts should consider the reliability of biomechanical 
analysis as three separate methodologies: (1) accident 
reconstruction; (2) computer simulation; and (3) extrapolation of 
population-based biomechanical studies to the facts of the case. 
The third step of this analysis is the most problematic, and it 
does not provide a reliable basis for reaching specific injury 
causation opinions because considerations such as testability, 
peer review, rate of error, and general acceptance weigh against 
the admissibility of these opinions.307 
Next, general causation opinions that are most likely to fall 
within biomechanical expertise and to be reliable fall into two 
main categories: opinions regarding which of two competing 
traumatic mechanisms was more likely to cause a plaintiff’s 
injury and opinions that the plaintiff’s injury is consistent with 
injury mechanisms that have been observed to increase the risk 
of injury in populations.308 
Courts should be wary of opinions claiming that causation is 
implausible based on “activities of daily living,” mechanisms of 
injury, or other biomechanical studies.309 Methodological 
weaknesses of “activities of daily living” studies make reliable 
extrapolations from these studies doubtful.310 Current 
                                                                                                     
 304. See supra notes 110–122 and accompanying text (discussing the 
distinction between general and specific causation). 
 305. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text (discussing the 
distinction between general and specific causation). 
 306. See supra Part V.C (applying Daubert’s reliability prong to 
biomechanical experts’ methodologies and arguing that reliability 
considerations weigh against the admission of specific causation opinions based 
on forensic biomechanical methods). 
 307. See supra Part V.C (same). 
 308. See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text (discussing the 
distinction between general and specific causation). 
 309. See supra Part V.C.iii (discussing the inability of current biomechanical 
literature to rule out causation in most cases). 
 310. See supra notes 272–281 and accompanying text (discussing the 
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biomechanical literature regarding a “no effect” threshold is 
insufficient to rule out causation as a matter of law, with a few 
narrow exceptions.311  
Finally, general causation opinions may not be relevant in 
personal injury cases where the issue in dispute is the existence 
or severity of injury.312 The likelihood that general causation 
opinions are irrelevant, confusing, misleading, or unfairly 
prejudicial is greatest when the plaintiff has a special 
susceptibility to injury or is otherwise unlike the test subjects of 
biomechanical studies.313 
VIII. Conclusion 
Over the past two decades, attorneys have retained 
biomechanical engineer experts in personal injury litigation with 
increasing frequency. Courts have disagreed about the scope of 
biomechanical expert opinions that are admissible under 
Daubert. This Note critically evaluates the application of the 
Daubert standard to biomechanical expert qualifications and 
methodologies. Biomechanical expert opinions are most likely to 
satisfy Daubert when addressing general aspects of causation. 
General causation opinions, however, are not always relevant or 
helpful in personal injury litigation. Therefore, this Note 
recommends a limited role for biomechanical experts in 
establishing or refuting injury causation.  
                                                                                                     
methodological weaknesses of studies supporting the “activities of daily living” 
threshold). 
 311. See supra Part V.C.iii (arguing that current biomechanical literature 
should only be sufficient to defeat claims of causation as a matter of law when 
the plaintiff’s theory contradicts an incontrovertible biologic principle). 
 312. See Part VI (discussing the relevance of general causation opinions in 
personal injury cases). 
 313. See supra notes 292–297 (collecting cases that have excluded general 
causation opinions due to a risk of misleading or confusing the jury or because of 
unfair prejudice). 
